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The allocation of capital to green projects have increased in recent years as focus on climate 
change and the necessity to transit to a more sustainable and carbon neutral environment have 
intensified. With decarbonization high on the agenda, and global regulations right around the 
corner, shipping companies must make important decisions today about which type of 
technology will be installed on their vessels in the decades to come.  
One instrument for allocating capital to green projects is the issuance of green bonds, whose 
popularity have exploded since the signing of the Paris Agreement. Because of the highly 
global and cyclical nature of the shipping industry, the changing face of green project 
financing raises an important question concerning whether green bond issuance influences the 
decision making of institutional investors in the shipping industry. Do institutional investors 
reward shipping companies who raises capital to fund green projects? 
This study addresses this issue by investigating the fundamental change in shipping 
companies’ ownership structure and risk profile in the years following implementation of 
green projects. Employing structural equation modeling, this study examines whether and how 
green bond issuance increase institutional ownership and reduce equity risk. We find evidence 
that following green bond issuance; total and unsystematic equity risk is reduced, cost of 
equity is reduced, and relative valuation is increased. Changes in institutional ownership is 
inconclusive. 
The implications of the findings are that equity owners in shipping companies could 
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1. Introduction 
A green bond is defined by the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) as debt 
instrument that follow the green bond principles (GBP), (ICMA, 2018) . In short, to be eligible 
to define your bond as green it has to follow the four core principles; (1) use of proceeds, (2) 
process for project evaluation and selection, (3) management of proceeds, and (4) reporting, 
laid out in the GBP. For a shipping company there are several potential projects that could be 
eligible for a green status, from funding of the entire vessel itself, to new propulsion 
technology or other pollution mitigation and biodiversity conservation technology. 
Green bonds could be attractive for companies as they, in some cases, provide preferential 
funding at lower rates (Liaw, 2020), also referred to as “greenium”. The consensus seems to 
be that in most cases green bonds are issued at a lower yield in the first-hand market, and trade 
at a premium in the secondary market (MacAskill, Roca, Liu, Stewart, & Sahin, 2021). 
Issuances are also often oversubscribed as many institutional investors have mandates to 
allocate capital to green projects. By investing in green bonds or the company that issue the 
bond, institutional investors signal that they have a responsible and forward looking long-term 
approach to capital allocation. This long-term view is usually synonymous with low risk and 
stable performance. Low risk is subsequently associated with lower cost of capital, which 
generally is associated with higher valuation. 
The greenium effect is primarily found in government issued and investment grade bonds, 
whereas shipping bonds primarily fall into the high yield category. This study compliments 
the literature by investigating the impact green shipping bonds have on equity risk. As previous 
studies concerning the effects of green bond issuance on equity risk does not explore the 
mediating effect of institutional ownership, this study not only complements the literature by 
investigating the impact of green bonds in the shipping industry, but also green bonds impact 
on institutional ownership and equity risk in general. Specifically, this study examines the 
relationship between all green shipping bond issuances and their impact on institutional 
ownership and equity risk, by exploring whether different institutional investors in different 
shipping segment perceive green bond issuance differently by using structural equation 
modelling (SEM).  
Green bond issuance growth accelerated rapidly in 2015, from USD 50 billion following the 
signing of the Paris Agreement, to USD 290 billion in 2020 (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2021). 
This growth is expected to continue in the years to come as the transition to renewable and 
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cleaner alternatives intensifies to combat climate change. Despite the enormous increase in 
green bond issuance, the shipping industry have not yet seen the same growth, with only four 
green bonds issued as of December 2020. Therefore, investigating the impact of green bonds 
issuance on shipping companies could not only provide important insights for shipowners 
regarding capital structure, but also on the potential benefits from investing in green vessel 
technology. There is currently no research on green bond issuance in the shipping industry. 
From this we develop two research questions. 
Research Questions: (1) Does green bond issuance reduce equity risk? (2) If so: is the 
reduction attributed to an increase in institutional ownership? 
The remaining of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses relevant literature of 
institutional ownership, equity risk, green bonds, and shipping. Chapter 3 first gives a detailed 
description of the green bonds, the sample companies, and preliminary data description. 
Chapter 4 first explain the methodology used to answer the research question, before giving a 
more detailed description for choice of research methodology. Chapter 5 presents the results. 
Chapter 6 elaborates on robustness and explores the omitted variable bias, before concluding 
remarks are provided in chapter 7. Appendix and references are located at the end of the thesis.  
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter explores previous literature on green bonds, institutional ownership, equity risk, 
and institutional ownership and firm performance in shipping.  
The impact of green initiatives, such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
environmental social and governance (ESG) related corporate initiative, on institutional 
ownership and equity risk have been well studied over the last decades. Early research did not 
provide consistent results. In a comprehensive study during the beginning of the decade 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000)  found that CSR related initiatives had a neutral effect on firm 
performance. In recent years, studies have been more consistent, Rehman, Khan, and Rahman 
(2020) found that CSR related initiatives positively impacts firm reputation and thereby 
improve firm performance and reduce equity risk. Fu, Lin, and Zhang (2020) found similar 
results for ESG related initiatives through the impact on institutional ownership, while a recent 
study by Huang (2021) shows that there is a positive, but modest link between ESG 
performance and firm financial performance when controlling for a wide range of variables.  
Though limited, there are research showing that institutional ownership increases while equity 
risk is reduced after green bond issuance. The largest study ever performed on green bond 
issuance was conducted by Tang and Zhang (2020), where they use a comprehensive dataset 
of all green bond issued over a ten year period to find that a positive cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) occurs around the announcement date, while institutional ownership is 
increased, and stock liquidity improved after issuance. Baulkaran (2019) also found a positive 
CAR around announcement date and was able to link those findings to a reduction in beta and 
total risk over the 250-day period following announcement using Morgan Stanley capital 
international MSCI world index as the reference. A study by Flammer (2021) and Wang, Chen, 
Li, Yu, and Zhong (2020) breaks down the positive stock market return into different types of 
institutional investors and find that the positive stock market reaction to green bond 
announcement can be attributed to especially long-term institutional investors such as norm 
constrained investors.  
What these studies on green bonds fail to address independently they answer collectively; 
green bond issuance seems to increase institutional ownership (especially norm constrained 
institutional ownership) and reduce equity risk. To the best of our knowledge, green bond 
issuance impact on the mediating effect of institutional ownership on equity risk has not been 
explored, certainly not in the shipping industry. 
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The green bond findings in the literature does not differentiate between industries but uses a 
broad range of companies to get the average market effect of green bond issuance on 
institutional ownership and equity risk. How green bonds impacts these variables in the 
shipping industry is not necessarily comparable to the market in general due to shipping’s 
capital intensive and cyclical nature. The limited literature that exist on the impact of 
institutional ownership on firm performance in the shipping industry is also not consistent; 
Drobetz, Ehlert, and Schröder (2021) find that there is a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and market value of global shipping firms, while Tsouknidis (2019) 
find that there is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance 
in US-listed shipping firms. Additionally, Drobetz et al. (2021) also finds that the institutional 
ownership value effect is more pronounced in shipping companies with institutional investors 
with short-term investment horizons, while other studies conducted by Cleary and Wang 
(2017) and Erhemjamts and Huang (2019) find that long-term norm constrained institutional 
investors are associated with better financial performance in general, which is consistent with 
the view that arbitrageurs places short-term pressure on companies and thereby discouraging 
long-term investments that create value.  
A possible explanation for the inconsistencies concerning institutional ownership and the 
shipping industry could be a study by Tsionas, Merikas, and Merika (2012) and Drobetz, 
Janzen, and Requejo (2019) where they identify a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and performance of publicly listed shipping companies. The rational being that 
large investors can be advantageous because the owner has incentive and power to monitor 
managers, thereby minimizing the free-rider problems in firms with more widely dispersed 
ownership structure. Another explanation could be that the research period influenced the 
results, as short-term investors to a larger degree try to time the market, while long-term 
investors does not (Derrien, Kecskés, & Thesmar, 2013). 
Considering the lack of consensus in the literature, this study not only provide valuable insight 
on how institutional investors impact firm performance in the shipping industry, but also on 
the interplay between this performance and green project financing, specifically green bonds. 
To the best of our knowledge this interplay has not been explored in shipping. 
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3. Sample and Data Description 
This chapter first gives a detailed description of the green bonds and sample companies, before 
providing a short introduction to the data sample. 
3.1 Green bond issuing companies and control groups 
Out of the approximately 2401 shipping companies listed on stock exchanges world-wide, four 
of them had issued green bonds as of December 31, 2020. Our sample covers these four 
companies and ten similar companies with no green bonds divided into three control groups. 
The four companies and their issuance will be explored individually throughout this thesis, 
but to account for heterogeneity among them, and to assign appropriate control groups, we 
separate one of the four (Altera Infrastructure) from the other three companies (referred to as 
the “three equities”). The reason being that Altera Infrastructure solely operate in the fossil 
transportation and exploration industry, and they were acquired right after issuance so only 
their preferred A shares are available for analysis and proxy for equity risk.  
This section first describes the three common equity companies (the three equities) and their 
control groups, before looking at the use of proceeds described in the bond prospectus. Then, 
Altera Infrastructure, their control group and use of proceeds are described. As all three control 
groups represent the majority of publicly traded companies in their respective segments, 
selection bias is mitigated. 
3.1.1 The three equities and their two control groups 
As described in Table 1, the three green bond issuing shipping companies: Evergreen Marine 
Corp., Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line (NYK), and Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (MOL) all announced and 
issued green bonds during May to September 2018. They have similar geographical origins 
(East Asia), fleet composition, and market capitalization. Ending 2020 the three shipping 
companies held a combined 12.1% of the total market share of the container shipping market. 
Evergreen held 5.5% market share, while Ocean Network Express, which is a joint venture 
between NYK and MOL established in 2017, held 6.6%. NYK and MOL also have large fleets 
of bulk, auto-liners, LNG, ferries, and other types of vessels. This type of conglomerate vessel 
 
1 Clarkson Shipping Intelligence Network 
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composition is also reflected in the control groups where many of the companies also owns 
similar types of vessels.  
Green bond use of proceeds: 
Evergreen use of proceeds primarily focused on installation of scrubber exhaust cleaning 
systems, which reduce Sulphur oxide (SOx). Their issuance size was $66 million, equivalent 
to 5% of their market capitalization on issuance date. NYKs use of proceeds also went towards 
scrubber installation. They further stated investments in liquified natural gas (LNG) as fuel, 
and also emphasized installation of ballast water management systems (BWMS) to reduce 
impact on local marine biodiversity. Their issuance size was $92 million, equivalent to 3% of 
market capitalization on the issuance date. MOLs use of proceeds also included scrubber 
installation, LNG, and BWMS. But further stated that proceeds will be used to install new 
more efficient propellers, and research and development of sails technology to be used on 
large bulk vessels in partnership with Tokyo University. MOLs issuance size was also $92 
million, equivalent to 4% of total market capitalization on the first of two issuance dates. In 
summary, much of the proceeds for the three equities went towards installation of emission 
and biodiversity reduction technology such as scrubbers and BWMS. Use of proceeds are 
discussed again in chapter 6. 
Control groups for Evergreen, NYK and MOL: 
To account for heterogeneity among the control group companies, they are divided into two 
groups primarily based on their geographical origins (ASIA and EUROPE), but also on market 
capitalization. Combined they consist of seven shipping companies with similar characteristics 
as the three equities. The Asian control group consists of five shipping companies; Kawasaki 
Kisen Kaisha (K-Line), Wan Hai Line, Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp., Orient Overseas, 
and Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM). They are all from the same geographical location as 
the three equities and have similar market capitalization. The European control group consists 
of two major listed European shipping companies; Hapag Lloyd and AP Moeller - Maersk, 
both with considerably larger market capitalization than the other companies in the sample.  
As of December 31, 2020, the three equities and both control groups combined represent the 
large majority of the worlds publicly traded container shipping companies, and around 50% 
of the total market share. 
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Table 1 – Company description, all units in millions 
Panel A - Green Bond Description 
Companies: Announcement Date Issuance Date Issuance Size (Local) 
Issuance Size on 
issue date (USD) 
Relative bond size vs 
Market Capitalization  
Evergreen Marine Corp. 15.05.2018 27.06.2018 2000TWD 66 5%  
NYK Line 18.05.2018 24.05.2018 10000JPY 92 3%  
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines 24.08.2018 30.08.2018 & 10.09.2018 2*5000JPY 92 3%  
Altera Infrastructure 09.10.2019 18.10.2019 & 28.08.2020 125 125 20%  
 
Panel B - Green Bond Issuing Companies Description 
 
Companies: Fleet Composition Exchange Average Market Capitalization Min Max  
Evergreen Container  TPE (Taiwan) 1871 1222 5147  
NYK Line Container, Dry Bulk, Auto-liner, LNG, Offshore TYO (Japan) 3139 2123 4459  
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Container, Dry Bulk, Ferry TYO (Japan) 3055 1997 4358  
Altera Infrastructure Shuttle Tankers, FPSO NYSE - USA 111 69 140  
 
Panel C - Control Groups 
 
Companies: Fleet Composition Exchange Average Market Capitalization Min Max  
"K" Line Container, Dry Bulk, Auto-liner, LNG, Oil Tankers TYO (Japan) 1745 812 2559  
Wan Hai Lines Container TPE (Taiwan) 1331 1085 3390  
Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp. Container, Dry Bulk TPE (Taiwan) 705 463 1662  
Orient Overseas Container HKEX (Hong Kong) 3775 2212 6294  
Hyundai Merchant Marine Container KRX (South Korea) 1215 345 3974  
Average Asian Control Group:  East Asia 1754 983.4 3575.8  
Hapag Lloyd Container, Cruise DAX (Germany) 7426 2135 27112  
AP Moller Maersk Container, Ferry, Oil Tankers, Offshore  CSE (Denmark) 29434 17924 42856  
Average European Control Group:  Europe 18430 10029.5 34984  
Knutsen NYK Offshore Tankers Shuttle Tankers NYSE (USA) 590 342 725  
Teekay LNG Partners LNG NYSE (USA) 1169 762 1639  
Teekay Tankers  Oil Tankers NYSE (USA) 405 267 762  
Average Fossil Control Group:   USA 721 457 1042  
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3.1.2 Altera Infrastructure and control group 
The shuttle tanker company Altera Infrastructure, formally known as Teekay Shuttle Tankers, 
announced issuance of two green bonds in October 2019 and issued subsequently that month 
and in October 2020. Even though the use of proceeds went towards funding vessel technology 
in four newbuilding vessels that would reduce CO2 emissions by approximately 50%, the bond 
was undersubscribed and only managed to raise USD 125 million of its initial USD 200 million 
goal. As reported by Financial Times (2019), consensus in the market seemed to be that a 
company that transport fossil fuel cannot call their financing green. 
As of December 2020, Altera Infrastructure held and operated 29 of the world’s 86 shuttle 
tankers and several floating storage and offloading vessels (FPSOs). Altera Infrastructure’s 
control group consists of three companies: their main competitor Knutsen NYK Offshore 
Tankers (KNOT), with management of the exact same number of shuttle tankers, and two 
companies associated with Altera Infrastructures’ former owner: Teekay LNG Partners and 
Teekay Tankers. Altera Infrastructure was acquired on January 23, 2020, by Brookfield Asset 
Management, three months after green bond issuance. As the common shares are no longer in 
circulation the six million listed preferred A shares are used as a proxy for development of 
institutional ownership and equity risk, the implications of this are discussed further 
throughout the thesis. 
3.2 Data Description 
Data from the three equities and the seven control group companies represented in two control 
groups was collected during the five year period from January 2016 to December 2020. The 
period was chosen because it gives the maximum (and almost equal) number of observations 
before and after issuance for all three equities. Data from Altera Infrastructure and the three 
companies making up the fossil control group was collected from September 2018 to 
December 2020, which provides an equal number of observations before and after issuance. 
As we are interested in exploring long-term fundamental change in equity risk and institutional 
ownership after green bond issuance, the equal period before and after issuance is the most 
appropriate approach.  
Daily market capitalization, equity price and turnover have been collected from the Bloomberg 
Terminal in USD, while monthly institutional ownership and other potential control variables 
have been collected from Eikon Platform on the last day of each month, or quarterly and 
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annually. All data have been calculated into monthly variables, resulting in 60 observations 
for the three equities and their two control groups, and 28 observations for Altera Infrastructure 
and their control group. Information concerning fleet composition and market share have been 
collected from the Clarkson Shipping Intelligence Network.  
Institutional ownership:  
To account for heterogeneity among institutional investors we follow Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2009) and divide them into norm (NORM) constrained institutional investors and natural 
arbitrageurs (ARB) institutional investors. Norm constrained investors are defined as pension 
funds, sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies and endowment funds. While arbitrageurs 
are defined as hedge funds, private equity firms, investments advisors, venture capital and 
mutual funds. Mutual funds can be considered as both norm constrained and arbitrageurs, but 
because they are actively managed and to some degree care about short-term performance, we 
place them into the arbitrageurs category. Total institutional ownership (IO) is the sum of 
NORM and ARB. 
Table 2 presents the data description of institutional ownership in the sample period. The data 
shows that the range of institutional ownership is wide throughout the sample, with Evergreen, 
NYK, MOL, and Altera infrastructure having an average level of total institutional ownership 
of 13%, 34%, 46%, and 26% respectively. For the Asian and European control groups their 
average results are similar, 23% and 20% respectively. Altera Infrastructure and the fossil 
control groups have relative high average institutional ownership presence in the sample. 
However, they also experience the largest reduction, as discussed later. Table 2 also 
demonstrates that arbitrageurs are the main institutional investors in the shipping industry. 
However, norm constrained institutional investors have larger presence in Evergreen, NYK, 
and MOL, also before green bond issuance, compared to their control groups. This could 
indicate that there are other fundamental differences between the sample companies which 
makes norm constrained institutional investors more inclined to invest in the three equities. 
Some of these differences are discussed further in chapter 6. 
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Table 2 – Summary statistics of institutional investor for sample period 
  Variable Obs Mean Median Min Max 
Evergreen 
     
 
IO 60 13 % 13 % 11 % 17 % 
NORM 60 6 % 6 % 5 % 8 % 
ARB 60 7 % 7 % 5 % 10 % 
NYK 
     
 
IO 60 34 % 35 % 26 % 45 % 
NORM 60 10 % 11 % 7 % 13 % 
ARB 60 24 % 24 % 19 % 32 % 
MOL 
     
 
IO 60 46 % 46 % 38 % 56 % 
NORM 60 12 % 13 % 9 % 15 % 
ARB 60 34 % 34 % 29 % 42 % 
Altera Infrastructure 
     
 
IO 28 26 % 24 % 16 % 40 % 
NORM 28 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
ARB 28 26 % 24 % 16 % 40 % 
ASIA 
     
 
IO 60 23 % 24 % 20 % 27 % 
NORM 60 4 % 4 % 3 % 6 % 
ARB 60 19 % 19 % 16 % 21 % 
EUROPE 
     
 
IO 60 20 % 20 % 18 % 24 % 
NORM 60 4 % 4 % 1 % 5 % 
ARB 60 17 % 17 % 14 % 19 % 
FOSSIL 
     
 
IO 28 46 % 43 % 33 % 67 % 
NORM 28 6 % 6 % 5 % 7 % 
ARB 28 40 % 38 % 27 % 60 % 
Evergreen – Evergreen Marine Corp., NYK - Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, MOL - Mitsui 
O.S.K. Lines, ASIA - Asian control group, EUROPE - European control group,  
FOSSIL - Fossil control group 
 
Equity risk: 
We follow Li, Nguyen, Pham, and Wei (2011) and use the change in daily equity price, 
standard deviation, to proxy for how total equity risk changes, calculated as monthly variables. 
Table 3 presents the data description of total risk in the sample period. The data shows that the 
range of daily standard deviation is wide throughout the sample with Evergreen having the 
lowest total risk of 1.44% and the fossil control group having the highest with 1.87%. This is 
interesting as the level of institutional ownership is considerably higher in the fossil control 
group, however these institutional investors are mainly arbitrageurs, which is in line with the 
literature suggesting these types of investors can have destabilizing effect on equity risk.   
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Table 3 – Summary statistics of daily standard deviation for sample period    
  Variable Obs Mean Median Min Max 
Evergreen 
     
  SD 60 0.0144 0.0130 0.0075 0.0264 
NYK 
     
  SD 60 0.0146 0.0133 0.0087 0.0247 
MOL 
     
  SD 60 0.0168 0.0148 0.0099 0.0298 
Altera Infrastructure 
     
  SD 28 0.0162 0.0128 0.0065 0.0412 
ASIA 
     
  SD 60 0.0153 0.0150 0.0068 0.0308 
EUROPE 
     
  SD 60 0.0177 0.0170 0.0105 0.0327 
FOSSIL 
     
  SD 28 0.0187 0.0179 0.0091 0.0405 
Evergreen – Evergreen Marine Corp., NYK - Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, MOL - Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, 
ASIA - Asian control group, EUROPE - European control group, FOSSIL - Fossil control group 
 
To ensure that outliers concerning abnormal equity prices does not bias calculations in the 
sample, following common practice laid out in a 2012 paper by Ghosh and Vogt (2012), values 
lower and greater than the 5th and 95th percentile are set to the 5th and 95th percentile. This 
ensures that, for example, large fluctuations during Covid-19 outbreak are reduced. This is 














.   
Grey area excluded from calculations 
Figure 1 – Evergreen, NYK, MOL and Altera Infrastructure standard deviation 
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4. Research Question and Methodology 
This chapter first explores the methodology used to answer the two research questions: (1) 
Does green bond issuance reduce equity risk? (2) If so: is the reduction attributed to an 
increase in institutional ownership? Then, financial methodology used for checking that 
results are consistent with what is happening in the market is explored. Finally, the structural 
equation model is explained.  
4.1 The impact of green bond issuance on institutional 
ownership and price volatility  
To answer if equity risk is reduced following green bond issuance, we calculate standard 
deviation for each specific company and weight the result by the average monthly market 
capitalization of that specific company in the control groups. Also, to supplement the main 
result for total risk we follow Y. Kim, M. Kim, and O'Neill (2013) and perform an additional 
test to calculate the unsystematic risk, which is the residuals from a regression of individual 
daily returns on the market return (MSCI) to proxy for idiosyncratic risk (IR). These daily 
residuals are also calculated into monthly standard deviation and explains how much equity 
risk changes compared to the market in the period following green bond issuance. 
To answer if institutional ownership increases in the period following green bond issuance, 
we calculated institutional ownership in the control groups as the monthly change for each 
specific company weighted by average monthly market capitalization. This is to capture the 
actual change in institutional ownership for the control groups and not the change in 
companies’ weights as a result of market capitalization fluctuations.  
From this we derive the following equations: 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎1 + 𝐵1𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜗1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡     (1) 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎2 + 𝐵2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵4𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
In equation (1), 𝐵1 is the coefficient of green bond issuance on institutional ownership. T is a 
time trend “dummy” variable equal to 0 before issuance and increasing to 0.5 in the month of 
issuance, and equal to 1 every month thereafter. The intermediary 0.5 is added because data 
on institutional ownership are collected at the end of each month. 𝜗1 is the coefficient of firm 
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specific control variables X on institutional ownership, and 𝑣𝑡 is the error term. In equation 
(2), equity price volatility is the change in daily standard deviation after green bond issuance. 
𝐵2 is the coefficient of institutional ownership on equity price volatility as a product of green 
bond issuance, while the direct effect of green bond issuance on equity price volatility is 𝐵3. 
𝐵1 is the coefficient of firm specific control variables X, while 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
4.2 The impact of green bond issuance on cost of equity and 
enterprice valuation  
To check that any change in equity risk is consistent with market developments, we first 
employ the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by Fama and MacBeth (1973) to calculate 
relative difference in cost of equity between equity “I” and control group “cg” after green bond 
issuance. 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖         (3) 
𝛽𝑖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑚) ∗
𝜎𝑖
𝜎𝑚
         (4) 
Where in equation (3) to (7): 
𝑅𝑖: return of equity i. 
𝑅𝑐𝑔: return of control group. 
𝑅𝑚: market return based on MSCI. 
𝑅𝑓: risk free rate of return. 
𝛽𝑖: beta, systematic risk of equity i. 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑚): correlation between equity return and market return. 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑅𝑐𝑔, 𝑅𝑚): correlation between control group return and market return. 
𝜎𝑖: standard deviation of return of equity. 
𝜎𝑐𝑔: standard deviation of return of control group. 
𝜎𝑚: standard deviation of market return based on MSCI. 
∆𝑅𝑖,𝑐𝑔: relative difference in cost of equity between equity i and control group. 
∆𝜎𝑖,𝑐𝑔: relative difference in total risk between equity i and control group cg. 
𝜖𝑖: residual of equity i.  
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Based on equation (3) and (4), the following equation can be derived:  
𝑅𝑖 = 𝑅𝑓 +
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑅𝑖,𝑅𝑚)
𝜎𝑚
∗ 𝑅𝑚 ∗ 𝜎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖         (5) 
We follow Fu et al. (2020) approach for quantifying effects of ESG related initiatives on cost 




even though 𝜎𝑖 is endogenous as a product of 𝑅𝑖. 
Different from Fu et al. (2020), we are primarily interested in the total difference in cost of 
equity (∆𝑅𝑖,𝑐𝑔,𝑡)  between equity “i" and control group “cg” after green bond issuance, 
compared to the period prior to issuance, resulting in the following two equations:  
∆𝑅𝑖,𝑐𝑔,𝑡 =  
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑅𝑖,𝑅𝑚)
𝜎𝑚
∗ 𝑅𝑚 ∗ ∆𝜎𝑖 −
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑅𝑐𝑔,𝑅𝑚)
𝜎𝑚
∗ 𝑅𝑚 ∗ ∆𝜎𝑐𝑔     (6) 
∆𝜎𝑖,𝑐𝑔,𝑡 =  ∆𝜎𝑖 − ∆𝜎𝑐𝑔          (7) 
Where ∆𝜎𝑖,𝑐𝑔 is the change in equity price volatility after green bond issuance between equity 
“i” (∆𝜎𝑖) and control group “cg” (∆𝜎𝑐𝑔), compared to the period prior to issuance, derived 
from Equation (1) and (2). 
Then, to investigate if a difference in cost of equity is synonymous with a relative difference 
in valuation, we employ multiple valuation methodology. We use market capitalization to 
revenue (P/S) and enterprise value to revenue (EV/S) multiples for relative valuation 
comparison to investigate if a difference in cost of equity is also associated with a difference 
in multiple expansion or contraction. The EV/S multiple are especially useful for comparison 
in industries with highly volatile profit margins (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2015), like 
shipping, where over the long term companies should have roughly similar profit margin. The 
change in multiple expansion or contraction between equity i and control group cg 
(∆𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑖−𝑐𝑔,𝑡) in the period following green bond issuance is calculated as a product of 
change in equity price volatility by re-calculating equation (1) and (2) while simultaneously 
adding a third equation: 
∆𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑐𝑔,𝑡 =  𝑎3 + 𝐵5∆𝜎𝑖,𝑐𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑧𝑖,𝑐𝑔,𝑡        (8) 
Here, 𝐵5 is the coefficient on how much one unit relative change in equity price volatility 
impacts relative valuation between equity “I” and the control groups “cg”. The rational for this 
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exercise is that any difference in cost of equity should be synonymous with a relative multiple 
expansion, all else equal. Likewise, any increase in relative cost of equity should be 
synonymous with a relative contraction in valuation multiples, all else equal. Also, when 
applying the well-known discounted cash flow model (DCFM) in valuation, there are two 
main ways a company can increase its valuation: cash flow either has to increase, or the 
discount rate calculated as a function of risk has to decrease. If the later occurs, all else equal, 
we get a relative multiple expansion. The “all else equal” assumption fails to address debt in 
its entirety. The implications of this, and why the assumption holds, is addressed in section 
5.4. 
4.3 The structual equation model  
Structural equation modeling (SEM) has been used in several studies in the shipping sector 
when exploring CSR and ESG related effects, similar to green bond effects. Using SEM, Yang 
(2018) finds a positive relationship between the effects of institutional pressures on green 
performance through the mediating effect of internal green practices in Taiwanese container 
shipping companies. Also using SEM, Yuen, Thai, Wong, and Wang (2018) find that service 
quality on financial performance on shipping firms with operations in Singapore is fully-
mediated by customer and job satisfaction. 
Our research question is a particular good fit for SEM as it enables us to explore different 
complex causal relationships among multiple variables by looking at the structure of 
interrelationships expressed in a series of equations simultaneously. This is done by 
constructing a model based on theory, prior experience, and research objectives (Hair, 
Anderson, Black, & Babin, 2018). SEM statistical theory is based on the distribution of the 
sample covariances in large samples. We follow methodology laid out in a 2019 paper by 
Maydeu-Olivares, Shi, and Rosseel (2019) and use maximum likelihood and assume that our 
data is normally distributed. By doing so the coefficients reflects the change in mean in the 
dependent variables as a function of the independent variables in the period after green bond 
issuance. 
To avoid misspecification of the model, selection among control variables has been done using 
theory, but also by looking at correlation matrixes found in Appendix 1-7. Variables that load 
inconsistently across different samples will not reflect the true population, and further 
reporting will not explain the phenomenon based on the correlation being far from the real 
   16 
relation (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2014). To avoid biased results, we only 
control for turnover as it is the only variable to be supported by theory and that loads 
consistently and significantly on equity risk in the correlation matrixes. Turnover is calculated 
as the daily traded volume divided by the total number of shares outstanding, where high 
turnover generally means higher equity price volatility (Ferreira & Matos, 2008). Other 
potentially relevant variables for institutional ownership and equity risk excluded from the 
model are ownership concentration, age of company, debt-to-equity, ESG-score, size (market 
capitalization), and company “green focus” as a result of a textual analysis. Model selection 
is discussed further in the chapter 6.  
To answer both research question, we simultaneously regress equation (1) and (2) using SEM. 
In the first regression, we regress institutional ownership on the green bond issuing time trend 
dummy variable (GBI). In the second regression we regress equity price volatility, daily 
standard deviation (SD), on the results from the first equation, the time trend dummy variable, 
and turnover (TURN). By doing so we find the effect of green bond issuance on institutional 
ownership and equity risk, and potential mediating effects. The indirect effect of green bond 
issuance on equity price volatility through the mediating effect of institutional ownership is 
𝐵1 multiplied by 𝐵2. The direct effect of green bond issuance on equity price volatility is 𝐵3. 
The total mediating effect is 𝐵1 ∗ 𝐵2 + 𝐵3, illustrated: 
 
Figure 2 – SEM illustration 
 
To address omitted variable bias, the endogeneity problem, and to avoid problems with 
nonnormal distribution we use lagged values of the independent variables and bootstrapping 
analysis to check the robustness of our main result. As we suspect equity price volatility to be 
correlated with omitted variables, we include control variables for the independent variables 
to increase the explanatory power of the model (Wilkins, 2018). By using lagged independent 
variables in our equations, we are able to account for historical factors that cause current 
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differences in the equity price volatility that are difficult to account for in other ways 
(Wooldridge, 2019). The main reason for putting lagged independent variables in the equation 
is that we expect companies with historically high institutional ownership and low turnover to 
have lower equity risk. Thus, unobserved factors that affect institutional ownership and 
turnover are likely to be correlated with equity risk. To check the stability of our coefficients 
we follow (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) and re-estimate Equation (1) and (2) using lagged values 
(1. month) and bootstrapping techniques (300 re-estimations).  
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between green bond issuance and multiple expansion or 
contraction by running equation (1), (2), and (8) simultaneously. From this we are able to 
observe if the relative valuation between the green bond issuing companies and their control 
groups expand or contract in the period following issuance as a product of change in equity 
price volatility. 
 
Figure 3 – SEM illustration with multiple expansion or contraction 
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5. Results and Analysis 
This chapter first presents the main results from the four green bond issuing companies, 
comparing fundamental developments in the period following issuance to the similar period 
prior to issuance. Second, we compare the development against the three control groups. Third, 
unsystematic risk is explored to further demonstrate that any reduction in volatility is directly 
attributed to effects related firm specific risk. Finally, potential implications on cost of equity 
and enterprise valuation are addressed.  
5.1 Main results for green bond issuers – Total Risk 
Table 4 reports the main findings from the presented SEM model that jointly estimates 
equation (1) and (2) for the four companies, for equivalent estimations for the control groups 
see Appendix 8.  
Institutional Ownership: 
The main results in Table 4 show that total institutional ownership increased in the period 
following green bond issuance for Evergreen, NYK and MOL, significant at the 1%,10% and 
10% respectively. For Evergreen there is a significant increase in arbitrageurs in the period 
following issuance, for NYK there is a significant increase in norm constrained investors 
following issuance, while for MOL there is a reduction in norm constrained investors and 
increase in arbitrageurs significant at the 5% and 1% level. For Altera Infrastructure 
institutional ownership, which only consists of arbitrageurs, decreased in the period following 
issuance, significant at the 1% level.  
Equity price volatility: 
Even though the results show that there in general is a significant increase in institutional 
ownership in the period following green bond issuance, the main results in Table 4 show that 
there is no indirect effect of institutional ownership on equity risk. NYK is the only company 
with a significant negative indirect effect on a reduction in equity risk through the increase of 
norm constrained investors. The total effect of green bond issuance on equity risk is also not 
consistent. Altera Infrastructure is the only company with a significant total effect result; 
however, it is positive, meaning that for Altera Infrastructure equity risk increased in the 
period following green bond issuance, confirming the notion that a fossil transportation 
company issuance of green bond is really not green. 
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Table 4 – Green bond companies results 
  Evergreen NYK MOL AI 
 IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB IO, ARB 
Institutional investor (Dep. Var)                        
GBI 0.0103*** 0.0025 0.0077*** 0.0219* 0.0339*** -0.0120 0.0188* -0.0104** 0.0292*** -0.0574*** 
 (2.62) (1.18) (2.73) (1.88) (11.38) (-1.18) (1.81) (-2.34) (4.11) (-3.17)    
Constant 0.1248*** 0.0592*** 0.0657*** 0.3325*** 0.0832*** 0.2492*** 0.4553*** 0.1275*** 0.3279*** 0.2710*** 
 (44.85) (38.71) (32.67) (42.33) (41.50) (36.22) (65.01) (42.68) (68.47) (29.90)    
Equity price volatility (Dep. Var)                        
Institutional investor 0.0128 -0.0802 0.0610 -0.0333*** -0.1372*** -0.0323** 0.0176 0.0730** 0.0112 0.0212    
 (0.29) (-1.10) (1.15) (-3.02) (-3.14) (-2.51) (1.33) (2.30) (0.59) (1.31)    
GBI -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0016 0.0009 0.0047*** -0.0002 0.0013 0.0023** 0.0013 0.0061**  
 (-1.26) (-1.18) (-1.51) (0.87) (2.64) (-0.14) (1.24) (2.26) (1.14) (2.46)    
TURN 0.3110*** 0.3585*** 0.2923*** 1.0473*** 0.9133*** 1.0756*** 1.1934*** 1.1017*** 1.2380*** 2.2370*** 
 (4.74) (6.00) (5.14) (5.14) (4.43) (5.15) (7.67) (6.92) (8.09) (5.85)    
Constant 0.0115** 0.0176*** 0.0092*** 0.0138*** 0.0157*** 0.0104*** -0.0044 -0.0047 -0.0006 0.0003    
 (2.14) (4.15) (2.66) (3.14) (3.28) (2.64) (-0.76) (-1.27) (-0.09) (0.06)    
Indirect effect 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0046*** 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0008 0.0003 -0.0012 
Total effect -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0012 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017 0.0049** 
R2 Institutional investor  0.1026 0.0227 0.1105 0.0554 0.6835 0.0226 0.0519 0.0837 0.2198 0.1433 
R2 Equity price volatility 0.3854 0.4665 0.3719 0.3834 0.3498 0.3667 0.5263 0.5194 0.6329 0.3908 
R2 total 0.4478 0.4707 0.4324 0.3467 0.7737 0.3446 0.5422 0.5424 0.6329 0.4759 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 28 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Evergreen - Evergreen Marine Corp., NYK - Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, MOL - Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, AI - Altera infrastructure   
GBI - Green Bond Issuance, TURN - Average daily turnover of outstanding shares 
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5.2 Difference-in-difference – Total Risk 
Table 5, 6 and 7 reports the difference in difference results that compares the results found in 
Table 4 to the equivalent results from the control groups by taking the difference between the 
variables used and re-estimating equation (1) and (2). Table 5 present the difference in 
difference between Evergreen, NYK and MOL with the Asian control group. Table 6 presents 
the difference in difference between Evergreen, NYK and MOL with the European control 
group. Table 7 presents the difference in difference between Altera Infrastructure and the 
Fossil control group.  
Institutional Ownership: 
The results in Table 5 show that compared to Asian control group, total institutional ownership 
increased in the period following green bond issuance in the three equities Evergreen, NYK 
and MOL significant at the 1%, 5%, and 5% level, respectively. For Evergreen there is a 
significant increase in arbitrageurs in Table 4. Compared to the Asian control group, a relative 
increase in norm constrained investors is the actual driver of the change in institutional 
ownership, significant at the 1% level. For NYK there is a significant increase in norm 
constrained investors in Table 4, this significance has now increased further when compared 
to the Asian control group. For MOL there is a reduction in norm constrained investors and 
increase in arbitrageurs significant at the 5% and 1% respectively in Table 4, when compared 
to the Asian control group the previous significant reduction in norm constrained investors is 
now not significant, and the increase in arbitrageurs has higher significance. 
From this we can conclude that there is a diverging pattern of institutional holdings among the 
three equities and the Asian control group. The observed increase in institutional ownership 
might be driven by these institutions increased willingness to hold these equities because they 
believe that issuance of green bonds will fund green vessel technology. Which in turn will 
make the companies better equipped to handle potential changes in regulator environment or 
get preferential treatment when chartered. As discussed further in the chapter 6, the increase 
might be driven by other factors than the green bond issuance. 
Equity price volatility: 
Even though the results in Table 5 support the notion that institutional ownership increase in 
the period following green bond issuance, the results also show that there is no clear indirect 
effect of institutional ownership on equity risk. However, the total effect of green bond 
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issuance on equity risk is negative and highly significant all three equities, meaning that equity 
risk is reduced in all three companies in the period following green bond issuance compared 
to the Asian control group. 
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Table 5 – Difference in difference three equities vs ASIA control group 
 Evergreen vs ASIA NYK vs ASIA MOL vg ASIA 
 IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB 
Institutional investor (Dep. Var)        
GBI 0.0193*** 0.0108*** 0.0085* 0.0302** 0.0419*** -0.0118 0.0271** -0.0023 0.0295*** 
 (3.28) (4.44) (1.83) (2.29) (11.98) (-1.04) (2.27) (-0.49) (3.54) 
Constant -0.1077*** 0.0135*** -0.1213*** 0.1007*** 0.0381*** 0.0626*** 0.2235*** 0.0824*** 0.1412*** 
 (-25.80) (7.81) (-36.97) (11.35) (16.16) (8.24) (27.70) (25.68) (25.14) 
Equity price volatility (Dep. Var)        
Institutional investor 0.0773** 0.0353 0.0946*** -0.0111 -0.0763** -0.0078 0.0073 0.0265 0.0062 
 (2.47) (0.43) (2.65) (-1.09) (-2.03) (-0.65) (0.58) (0.87) (0.33) 
GBI -0.0053*** -0.0047*** -0.0048*** -0.0043*** -0.0014 -0.0047*** -0.0031*** -0.0028** -0.0031** 
 (-4.09) (-3.29) (-3.86) (-4.01) (-0.77) (-4.52) (-2.60) (-2.49) (-2.41) 
TURN 0.1293 0.2268** 0.1694** 0.4947*** 0.4710*** 0.5054*** 0.6019*** 0.5865*** 0.5984*** 
 (1.45) (2.33) (2.12) (4.06) (3.93) (4.14) (4.36) (4.38) (4.22) 
Constant 0.0092*** 0.0006 0.0124*** -0.0005 0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0025 -0.0012 
 (2.70) (0.37) (2.84) (-0.35) (0.75) (-0.93) (-0.64) (-0.91) (-0.41) 
Indirect effect 0.0015** 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0032** 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002 
Total effect -0.0038***  -0.0043*** -0.0040*** -0.0046*** -0.0046*** -0.0046*** -0.0029** -0.0029** -0.0029** 
R2 Institutional investor  0.1521 0.2474 0.0531 0.0804 0.7051 0.0178 0.0789 0.0040 0.1726 
R2 Equity price volatility 0.2381 0.2009 0.2550 0.3962 0.4150 0.3929 0.2978 0.2941 0.2932 
R2 total 0.3291 0.3937 0.2500 0.4116 0.7693 0.4037 0.3531 0.2884 0.4126 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Evergreen - Evergreen Marine Corp., NYK - Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, MOL - Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, ASIA - Asian control group 






The main results in Table 6 show that compared to the European control group, total 
institutional ownership decreased in the period following green bond issuance for Evergreen, 
NYK and MOL, significant at the 1% level for Evergreen and not significant for NYK and 
MOL. For Evergreen there is a significant increase in arbitrageurs in Table 4. When compared 
to the European control group, both norm constrained and arbitrageurs declines, significant at 
the 1% and 10% level. For NYK there is a significant increase in norm constrained investors 
in Table 4, this significance has now increased further when compared to the European control 
group. For MOL there is a reduction in norm constrained investors and an increase in 
arbitrageurs significant at the 5% and 1% level in Table 4, when compared to the European 
control group the direction remains the same, but significance is changed to the 1% and 10% 
level. 
Equity price volatility: 
As there is no clear increase in institutional ownership compared to the European control 
group, there is no clear indirect effect of institutional ownership on equity risk. However, the 
total effect of green bond issuance on equity risk is also negative and highly significant for all 
three, meaning that equity risk is reduces in all three equities in the period following green 
bond issuance compared to the European control group. It is not possible to say with that this 
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Table 6 – Difference in difference three equities vs EUROPE control group   
  Evergreen vs EUROPE NYK vs EUROPE MOL vg EUROPE 
 IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB 
Institutional investor (Dep. Var)        
GBI -0.0149*** -0.0080*** -0.0070* 0.0004 0.0251*** -0.0247** -0.0026 -0.0192*** 0.0165* 
 (-3.02) (-2.65) (-1.69) (0.03) (7.67) (-2.37) (-0.22) (-4.04) (1.93) 
Constant -0.0672*** 0.0277*** -0.0950*** 0.1374*** 0.0505*** 0.0869*** 0.2603*** 0.0947*** 0.1655*** 
 (-19.16) (12.97) (-32.46) (17.54) (22.93) (12.36) (32.14) (29.63) (28.75) 
Equity price volatility (Dep. Var)        
Institutional investor 0.0024 0.0707 -0.0350 -0.0180 -0.1269*** -0.0098 -0.0004 0.0065 -0.0024 
 (0.05) (1.10) (-0.74) (-1.40) (-2.94) (-0.68) (-0.03) (0.18) (-0.13) 
GBI -0.0054*** -0.0048*** -0.0058*** -0.0041*** -0.0009 -0.0043*** -0.0023* -0.0022 -0.0023* 
 (-3.26) (-3.12) (-3.98) (-3.42) (-0.60) (-3.48) (-1.96) (-1.63) (-1.86) 
TURN 0.3418*** 0.3091*** 0.3687*** 0.5361** 0.5138** 0.5238** 0.5260*** 0.5070** 0.5298*** 
 (3.95) (4.18) (4.97) (2.19) (2.22) (2.11) (2.75) (2.50) (2.88) 
Constant -0.0021 -0.0041** -0.0057 -0.0042 0.0000 -0.0057* -0.0046 -0.0051 -0.0043 
 (-0.61) (-2.10) (-1.21) (-1.34) (0.00) (-1.94) (-1.33) (-1.62) (-1.34) 
Indirect effect -0.0000 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0032*** 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 
Total effect -0.0055*** -0.0053*** -0.0056*** -0.0041*** -0.0041*** -0.0041*** -0.0023** -0.0023** -0.0023** 
R2 Institutional investor  0.1323 0.1046 0.0456 -0.0000 0.4953 0.0854 0.0008 0.2139 0.0587 
R2 Equity price volatility 0.3670 0.3488 0.4003 0.2861 0.3525 0.2663 0.1831 0.1766 0.1847 
R2 total 0.4430 0.3869 0.4275 0.2685 0.5411 0.3265 0.1837 0.3400 0.2280 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Evergreen - Evergreen Marine Corp., NYK - Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, MOL - Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, EUROPE - European control group 
GBI - Green Bond Issuance, TURN - Average daily turnover of outstanding shares 
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Institutional Ownership: 
The main results in Table 7 show that compared to fossil control group, total institutional 
ownership increased in the period following green bond issuance for Altera Infrastructure, 
significant at the 5% level. This is because the declining trend in institutional ownership stops 
after issuance while the level of institutional ownership in the fossil control group continues 
to decline. Total institutional ownership in the fossil control group is still over twice as high 
in the period following issuance. The decline in institutional ownership in both Altera 
Infrastructure and its control group is mostly (or only) driven by a selloff from arbitrageurs, 
as norm constrained investors are not present in the sector to any significant degree. This is 
consistent with literature and the notion that norm constrained investors have longer 
investment horizons and thereby are more interested in sustainable investments which is likely 
to become a part of the solution to climate change. Investments in fossil transportation 
shipping companies might be considered by long-term investors as highly risky because the 
changing regulatory environment could lead to a situation with stranded assets, such as oil 
tankers, with little to no value. 
Equity price volatility: 
Even though there is a relative increase in institutional ownership, there is no significant 
indirect effect or total effect on equity risk. Drawing causal inference with Altera 
Infrastructure is, and would have been, difficult regardless of significant results or not, due to 
the characteristics of the preferred A shares. The results must also be viewed in the light of the 
models low R2 compared to the other models, implying less explanatory value of results.  
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Table 7 – Difference in difference Altera Infrastructure vs FOSSIL control group 
  AI 
 IO ARB 
Institutional investor (Dep. Var)   
GBI 0.0279** 0.0311**  
 (1.96) (2.28)    
Constant -0.2097*** -0.1501*** 
 (-29.49) (-21.97)    
Equity price volatility (Dep. Var)   
Institutional investor -0.0030 -0.0014    
 (-0.17) (-0.07)    
GBI 0.0013 0.0012    
 (0.48) (0.46)    
TURN 0.6283*** 0.6258*** 
 (2.71) (2.70)    
Constant -0.0021 -0.0017    
 (-0.54) (-0.57)    
Indirect effect -0.0001 -0.0000 
Total effect 0.0012 0.0012 
R2 Institutional investor  0.0604 0.0796 
R2 Equity price volatility  0.1391 0.1381 
R2 total 0.1878 0.2039 
Observations 28 28 
t statistics in parentheses   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
AI - Altera infrastructure, GBI - Green Bond Issuance,  
TURN - Average daily turnover of outstanding shares 
 
Summary main findings: 
In short, the findings in Table 5, 6, and 7 confirm that the institutional investors are not one 
homogenous group. Arbitrageurs are found to be the major institutional investors in the 
shipping industry. This is consistent with Drobetz et al. (2021) whose research show that  
short-term arbitrageurs are the main drivers for the positive institutional ownership effect on 
firm performance in the shipping industry. This might be due to the cyclical nature of the 
industry, where arbitrageurs to a larger degree try to time the cycles by chasing short-term 
gains.  
When compared to their peers, the relative increase in norm constrained investors is found to 
have the largest impact reduction in equity risk for the three equities in the period after 
issuance, the results form Altera Infrastructure is inconclusive. This finding implies that, in 
general norm constrained institutional investors in shipping companies can help stabilize 
equity prices after green bonds are issued. This result is consistent with Ruiz-Mallorquí and 
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Santana-Martín (2011) research that norm constrained institutional investors can stabilize 
equity prices by effectively monitor firms and by minimizing information asymmetries and 
agency problems. In contrast, arbitrageurs usually destabilize equity prices by seeking quick 
profits (David & Kochhar, 1996). Also, the results are consistent with the literature review on 
green bonds discussed, confirming that institutional ownership is increased in most cases, and 
equity risk reduced in the period after green bond issuance.  
In conclusion, the main findings provide no clear evidence of an indirect effect or mediating 
of institutional ownership on equity risk in the shipping industry after green bond issuance. 
However, results shows that the total reduction in equity price volatility for the three equities 
in the period after green bond issuance is highly significant compared to both the Asian and 
European control group. Further thought concerning causality are discussed in chapter 6.  
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5.3 Idiosyncratic Risk 
To capture unsystematic risk and to further demonstrate that the reduction in equity price 
volatility is directly attributed to firm specific reasons, we supplement our main results based 
on total equity risk (SD) with additional tests concerning idiosyncratic risk (IR). By doing so, 
we can better capture the effect of green bond issuance on unsystematic risk that occurs in a 
particular equity in the period following issuance.  
Table 8 compares total risk from Table 3 with idiosyncratic risk over the five year sample 
period. The results show that shipping companies primarily face unsystematic risk. This can 
be attributed to the cyclical nature of shipping, where the main drivers of valuation, freight 
rates, are determined by many complex variables other than the world economy (Stopford, 
2008) reflected in the MSCI.  
 Table 8 – Summary statistics of total and idiosyncratic risk  
  Variable Obs Mean Median Min Max 
MSCI 















    
 
SD 60 0.0144 0.0130 0.0075 0.0264  
IR 60 0.0139 0.0129 0.0074 0.0238 
NYK 
     
 
SD 60 0.0146 0.0133 0.0087 0.0247  
IR 60 0.0141 0.0130 0.0080 0.0240 
MOL 
     
 
SD 60 0.0168 0.0148 0.0099 0.0298  
IR 60 0.0162 0.0146 0.0098 0.0280 
Altera Infrastructure 
     
 
SD 28 0.0162 0.0128 0.0065 0.0412 
  IR 28 0.0164 0.0136 0.0075 0.0364 
ASIA 
     
 
SD 60 0.0153 0.0150 0.0068 0.0308  
IR 60 0.0150 0.0145 0.0068 0.0292 
EUROPE 
     
 
SD 60 0.0177 0.0170 0.0105 0.0327  
IR 60 0.0158 0.0151 0.0088 0.0288 
FOSSIL 
     
 
SD 28 0.0187 0.0179 0.0091 0.0405 
  IR 28 0.0173 0.0160 0.0090 0.0362 
Evergreen – Evergreen Marine Corp., NYK - Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, MOL - Mitsui O.S.K. Lines,  
ASIA – Asian control group, EUROPE - European control group, FOSSIL - Fossil control group, 
SD – Total risk, IR - Idiosyncratic risk 
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The main results presented in Table 9, 10 and 11 are in line with those reported in Table 5, 6, 
and 7, suggesting that after subtracting market volatility, Evergreen, NYK and MOL continue 
to load significantly and negatively on the individual equity price volatility when compared to 
the Asian and European control group, providing further support for the risk-mitigating effect 
of green bond issuance. 
Evergreen, NYK, MOL: 
Even though the results in section 5.2 support the notion that institutional ownership increase 
in the period following green bond issuance compared to the Asian control group, the results 
also here show that there is no clear indirect effect of institutional ownership on idiosyncratic 
risk. However, the total effect of green bond issuance on idiosyncratic volatility is negative 
and highly significant for the three equities, meaning that unsystematic risk is reduces in in 
the period following green bond issuance compared to the Asian control group.  
As there is no clear increase in institutional ownership compared to the European control 
group, there is also here no clear indirect effect of institutional ownership on idiosyncratic 
risk. However, the total effect of green bond issuance on idiosyncratic volatility is also 
negative and highly significant for the three equities, meaning that unsystematic risk is also 
reduces in the period following green bond issuance when compared to the European control 
group. It is not possible to say that this reduction alone is a product of the increase in 
institutional ownership based on the model.  
In general, these results also suggest that shipping companies with a larger proportion of norm-
constrained institutional investors could also enjoy lower idiosyncratic risk. 
Altera infrastructure: 
As mentioned earlier there is a relative increase in institutional ownership, but still no 
significant indirect effect or total effect on idiosyncratic risk when compared to the fossil 
control group, making it difficult to draw any causal inference with Altera Infrastructure. Also, 
the models’ explanatory value (R2) is still lower than the other models. Because of this, and 
because there are no comparable valuation multiples for them due to being acquired shortly 
after issuance, we exclude Altera Infrastructure for further tests concerning cost of equity and 
valuation.
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Table 9 – Difference in difference three equities vs ASIA control group (idiosyncratic risk) 
  Evergreen vs ASIA NYK vs ASIA MOL vg ASIA 
 IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB 
Institutional investor (Dep. Var)        
GBI 0.0193*** 0.0108*** 0.0085* 0.0302** 0.0419*** -0.0118 0.0271** -0.0023 0.0295*** 
 (3.28) (4.44) (1.83) (2.29) (11.98) (-1.04) (2.27) (-0.49) (3.54)    
Constant -0.1077*** 0.0135*** -0.1213*** 0.1007*** 0.0381*** 0.0626*** 0.2235*** 0.0824*** 0.1412*** 
 (-25.80) (7.81) (-36.97) (11.35) (16.16) (8.24) (27.70) (25.68) (25.14)    
Idiosyncratic risk (Dep. Var)        
Institutional investor 0.0784** 0.0488 0.0932** -0.0077 -0.0677* -0.0040 0.0067 0.0184 0.0079    
 (2.46) (0.58) (2.55) (-0.80) (-1.91) (-0.35) (0.58) (0.65) (0.46)    
GBI -0.0052*** -0.0047*** -0.0047*** -0.0044*** -0.0018 -0.0046*** -0.0031*** -0.0029*** -0.0032*** 
 (-3.96) (-3.24) (-3.71) (-4.32) (-1.00) (-4.73) (-2.87) (-2.78) (-2.73)    
TURN 0.1017 0.1912* 0.1447* 0.4997*** 0.4746*** 0.5089*** 0.5548*** 0.5399*** 0.5569*** 
 (1.12) (1.93) (1.77) (4.36) (4.22) (4.44) (4.36) (4.36) (4.27)    
Constant 0.0091*** 0.0002 0.0121*** -0.0011 0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0016    
 (2.64) (0.12) (2.71) (-0.75) (0.50) (-1.34) (-0.67) (-0.74) (-0.56)    
Indirect effect 0.0015** 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0028* 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0002 
Total effect -0.0037*** -0.0042*** -0.0039*** -0.0046*** -0.0046*** -0.0046*** -0.0030*** -0.0030*** -0.0030*** 
R2 Institutional investor  0.1521 0.2474 0.0531 0.0804 0.7051 0.0178 0.0789 0.0040 0.1726 
R2 Idiosyncratic risk  0.2255 0.1748 0.2342 0.4218 0.4395 0.4208 0.3092 0.3015 0.3090 
R2 total 0.3179 0.3757 0.2320 0.4433 0.7776 0.4306 0.3635 0.2989 0.4259 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Evergreen - Evergreen Marine Corp., NYK - Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, MOL - Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, ASIA - Asian control group 










Table 10 – Difference in difference three equities vs EUROPE control group (idiosyncratic risk)   
  Evergreen vs EUROPE NYK vs EUROPE MOL vg EUROPE 
 IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB 
Institutional investor (Dep. Var)        
GBI -0.0149*** -0.0080*** -0.0070* 0.0004 0.0251*** -0.0247** -0.0026 -0.0192*** 0.0165*   
 (-3.02) (-2.65) (-1.69) (0.03) (7.67) (-2.37) (-0.22) (-4.04) (1.93)    
Constant -0.0672*** 0.0277*** -0.0950*** 0.1374*** 0.0505*** 0.0869*** 0.2603*** 0.0947*** 0.1655*** 
 (-19.16) (12.97) (-32.46) (17.54) (22.93) (12.36) (32.14) (29.63) (28.75)    
Idiosyncratic risk (Dep. Var)        
Institutional investor 0.0165 0.0645 -0.0167 -0.0273** -0.1450*** -0.0196 -0.0032 -0.0089 -0.0036    
 (0.39) (1.09) (-0.38) (-2.36) (-3.74) (-1.48) (-0.24) (-0.25) (-0.20)    
GBI -0.0045*** -0.0042*** -0.0050*** -0.0037*** -0.0001 -0.0042*** -0.0021* -0.0022* -0.0020*   
 (-2.97) (-3.01) (-3.73) (-3.42) (-0.08) (-3.66) (-1.82) (-1.71) (-1.70)    
TURN 0.2434*** 0.2305*** 0.2744*** 0.5813*** 0.5457*** 0.5693** 0.6411*** 0.6483*** 0.6336*** 
 (3.06) (3.39) (4.00) (2.62) (2.62) (2.50) (3.47) (3.31) (3.57)    
Constant 0.0005 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0020 0.0019 -0.0040 -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.0039    
 (0.15) (-1.32) (-0.53) (-0.72) (0.63) (-1.47) (-1.12) (-1.24) (-1.25)    
Indirect effect -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0036*** 0.0005 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0001 
Total effect -0.0048*** -0.0047*** -0.0049*** -0.0037*** -0.0037*** -0.0037*** -0.0021** -0.0021** -0.0021** 
R2 Institutional investor   0.1323 0.1046 0.0456 0.0000 0.4953 0.0854 0.0008 0.2139 0.0587 
R2 Idiosyncratic risk  0.2937 0.2937 0.3266 0.3385 0.4087 0.3005 0.2338 0.2370 0.2303 
R2 total 0.3689 0.3319 0.3569 0.2945 0.5495 0.3599 0.2340 0.3963 0.2709 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Evergreen - Evergreen Marine Corp., NYK - Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, MOL - Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, EUROPE - European control group 
GBI - Green Bond Issuance, TURN - Average daily turnover of outstanding shares 
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Table 11 – Difference in difference Altera Infrastructure vs FOSSIL control 
group (idiosyncratic risk) 
  AI 
 IO ARB 
Institutional investor (Dep. Var) 
GBI 0.0279** 0.0311** 
 (1.96) (2.28) 
Constant -0.2097*** -0.1501*** 
 (-29.49) (-21.97) 
Idiosyncratic risk (Dep. Var) 
Institutional investor 0.0010 0.0025 
 (0.06) (0.14) 
GBI 0.0013 0.0012 
 (0.55) (0.52) 
TURN 0.7255*** 0.7246*** 
 (3.44) (3.44) 
Constant 0.0005 0.0007 
 (0.15) (0.25) 
Indirect effect 0.0000 0.0001 
Total effect 0.0013 0.0013 
R2 Institutional investor  0.0604 0.0796 
R2 Idiosyncratic risk  0.2071 0.2685 
R2 total 0.2532 0.2685 
Observations 28 28 
t statistics in parentheses  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
AI - Altera infrastructure, GBI - Green Bond Issuance,  





5.4 Impact on Valuation 
As the results show no clear mediating effect of green bond issuance on equity risk through 
institutional ownership, we use the difference in total equity return volatility to calculate the 
relative change in cost of equity between the three equities and their two control groups 
following issuance, illustrated in Table 12 and 13. By doing so, we check if the relative change 
in difference in total equity risk found in 5.2 is synonymous with a relative change in cost of 
equity, and subsequent we check if the change in cost of equity can explain any relative 
difference in enterprise valuation. The assumption for the cost of equity calculations is that 
cost of debt and debt-to-equity ratios remain unchanged throughout the sample period. The 
unchanged debt-to-equity ratio assumption holds fairly well when comparing the average 
debt-to-equity ratio of the three equities with both control groups, illustrated below:  
 
Figure 4 – Difference in debt-to-equity ratio 
The results in Table 13 show that Evergreen has a relative reduction in daily cost of equity 
compared to both the Asian and European control groups in the period following green bond 
issuance. The results also show that Evergreen experience an expansion in both P/S and EV/S 
multiples in the period following issuance compared to the Asian control group, both 
significant at the 5% level. When compared to the European control group, both P/S and EV/S 
multiples also expand, significant at the 1% level.  
For NYK the results also show that daily cost of equity is reduced when compared to both 
control groups. The results further show that the EV/S multiple experience a relative 
expansion, significant at the 10% level when compared to the Asian control group. When 
compared to the European control group both P/S and EV/S multiples expand for NYK, 
significant at the 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 12 – Cost of capital calculation inputs for Equation (5) and (6) 
ASIA vs: Total effect 
(i-cg) Table 5  
Total effect 
(i), Table 4 










Evergreen -0.0038*** non-sig 0.0047*** 0.4531 0.2103 0.0004 0.0058  
NYK -0.0046*** non-sig 0.0048*** 0.6251 0.2103 0.0004 0.0058  
MOL -0.0029*** non-sig 0.0048*** 0.6608 0.2103 0.0004 0.0058  
   
EUROPE vs: Total effect 
(i-cg) Table 6 
Total effect 
(i) Table 4 
Total effect (cg) 
“Appendix 8” 








Evergreen -0.0055*** non-sig 0.0061*** 0.4531 0.4000 0.0004 0.0058  
NYK -0.0041*** non-sig 0.0055*** 0.6251 0.4000 0.0004 0.0058  
MOL -0.0023* non-sig 0.0055*** 0.6608 0.4000 0.0004 0.0058  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
Evergreen - Evergreen Marine Corp., NYK - Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, MOL - Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, EUROPE - European control 
group, ASIA - Asian control group. (i-cg): difference in difference between equity (i) and control group (cg). Correlation (Ri, Rm): 
correlation between equity (i) and MSCI. Correlation (Rcg, Rm): correlation between control group (cg) and MSCI. Return MSCI is 
the average daily return during the period. Std.Dev MSCI is the average daily standard deviation of the MSCI during the sample 
period. “Appendix 8” – shows average numbers for the three equities, real numbers listed in this table 
 
 










Evergreen -0.0041% 0.0188** 0.0649**  
NYK -0.0063% -0.0015 0.0282*  
MOL 0.0017% -0.0104 0.0171  












Evergreen -0.0153% 0.0437*** 0.1127***  
NYK -0.0094% 0.0584** 0.1357***  
MOL -0.0006% 0.0202 0.0592*  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
Difference in P/S and EV/S multiple valuation: 
positive number = expansion, negative = contraction, 
relative to the respective control group in the period 
following green bond issuance. 
 
 




(0.4531 ∗ (0.0047-0.0038) - 0.2103*0.0047) = -0.0041% 
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For MOL the results show a relative increase in daily cost of equity compared to the Asian 
control groups, and a slight increase when compared to the European. The relative valuation 
for MOL does not yield any significant differences when compared to the Asian control group. 
However, when compared to the European control group EV/S multiple expand, significant at 
the 10%.   
In short, five of six relative changes in cost of equity are reductions, and all significant results 
on changes in relative valuation multiples are expansions. But the assumption of no change in 
cost of debt weakens any conclusion connecting potential reduction in cost of equity and 
increased valuation. However, if companies are homogenous, which we argue our sample are, 
increased relative leverage should increase both cost of debt and cost of equity, while reduced 
relative leverage should reduce cost of debt and cost of equity, all else equal. As illustrated in 
Figure 4, the relative debt-to-equity ratio for the three equities increase or remains equal when 
compared to the European control group after green bond issuance, while relative debt-to-
equity ratio is reduction when compared to the Asian control group. Because of these diverging 
trends we conclude that the reduction in cost of equity in the period following green bond 
issuance gives a correct picture of reality, and that this reduction in cost of equity is associated 
with increased valuation through multiple expansion. The results are consistent with the 
literature review, linking green project investment to reduced equity risk and increased 
enterprise valuation.  
A study by H.-D. Kim, Y. Kim, Mantecon, and Song (2019) on US firms found that investment 
horizon of institutional investors is negatively correlated with the number of loan covenants 
and loan spreads. In other words, it could be that an increased institutional ownership reduces 
cost of debt, and in that way cost of equity is reduced as more capital goes to equity investors. 
However, this argument falls short when comparing Evergreen and NYK to the European 
control group as their relative debt-to-equity ratio worsens, while relative institutional 
ownership remains unchanged, and subsequently equity risk is significantly reduced.  
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6. Discussion 
So far, we have shown that for three of four green bond issuing shipping companies, equity 
risk is reduced, and in some cases, institutional ownership increased in the period following 
issuance when compared to peers. The results are also robust, appendix 9-12 reports the 
lagged-bootstrapped results equivalent to the results found in Table 4, 5, 6 and 7. The results 
remains fairly unchanged, which implies that other variables excluded from the model does 
not bias the equity price volatility significantly, and the endogeneity problem is addressed by 
confirming that historical level of institutional ownership and turnover are associated with 
equity risk, as expected. However, there is no clear significant mediating effect, which could 
imply further problems with omitted variable bias. To say anything about causal inference we 
need to address these variables and other potential economic or behavioral explanations for 
the results. 
This chapter first explores the dropped variables mentioned in the methodology section, and 
their impact on the dependent variables in the SEM model by using, among other, the Pearson 
correlation matrixes in Appendix 1-7. Second, we discuss the event horizon, and use of green 
bonds proceeds in relation to the climate bond initiative (CBI) criteria for alignment with the 
Paris Agreement as an explanation for potential mediocre increase in institutional ownership. 
Finally, we discuss recent trends and developments in green project financing in shipping, 
before addressing limitations of the thesis. 
6.1 Dropped variables 
Variables which are inconsistent is uninterpretable and have been excluded from the model 
(Antonakis et al., 2014). The variables below have been tested in this study but are dropped 
due to, among other, loading inconsistently in the correlation matrix. Nevertheless, they might 
affect institutional ownership and equity risk, which is why they are addressed below. For 
Pearson correlation, see Appendix 1-7. For data description of dropped variables, see 
Appendix 13. 
- According to the literature, increased ownership concentration (CON) in shipping firms is 
associated with increased firm performance. However, ownership concentration loads 
significantly and in different direction throughout the correlation matrixes. This can be 
attributed to ownership concentration being significantly higher in the Asian and European 
control groups and does not change much in the three equities during the sample period.  
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- Increased ESG score could be a potential explanation for some of the increased institutional 
ownership seen in the three equities. As discussed in the literature review, ESG related 
corporate initiatives are associated with higher institutional ownership. ESG score derived 
from Eikon loads consistently on institutional ownership. However, they do not load 
consistently on total risk (SD) and idiosyncratic risk (IR). This can be attributed to ESG score 
being reported annually, and also missing from some sample companies.  
- Green focus (GF). Because data related to ESG is limited, we follow Sjøstedt and Parow 
(2019) and perform a green focus textual analysis on the annual report of Evergreen, NYK, 
MOL, and the companies in the Asian and European control groups over the five year sample 
period. The rationale behind the analysis is that increased institutional ownership and/or 
reduction in equity risk could be attributed to an overall green focus signaled through the 
annual report. The number of times green focus words: Green, Sustainable, ESG, Emission, 
and Environment, are used in each annual report are summarized for each company. The 
results show that over the five year sample period, green focus on average grew annually by 
7% for the three equities, 8% for the Asian and 30% for the European control group. Illustrated 
below:  
  
Figure 5 – Green focus textual analysis results 
 
Because of the growth in green focus is higher in the control groups, it is difficult to say that 
green focus is responsible for the relative change in institutional ownership seen in some of 
the results, even though green focus loads positively and consistently on institutional 
ownership in the three equities. However, it could be that higher green focus is associated 
lower equity risk and higher valuation through better reputation. This relationship is studied 
in a recent 2020 study by Rehman et al. (2020), where they find that CSR initiatives are 
   38 
associated with better reputation, which then are associated with lower equity risk and higher 
valuation. The reputation effect in shipping companies could be subject for further studies. 
- Age of companies and market capitalization also does not load consistently. 
- Debt-to-equity (DE). As discussed thoroughly in section 5.4, increased leverage is in theory 
synonymous with increased risk. However, debt-to-equity does not load consistently on total 
risk or idiosyncratic risk. This means that in our sample, increased debt-to-equity would in 
some cases reduce equity risk if included in the model, which is not consistent with economic 
theory. Also, the relative change in debt-to-equity ratio between Evergreen, NYK, and MOL 
compared to the Asian control group is decreasing, meaning that debt-to-equity increase in the 
Asian control group in the period following issuance. This could be a possible explanation for 
the change in equity risk had it not been for the relative change in debt-to-equity trends in the 
opposite direction for the European control group, where equity risk is also reduced 
significantly.  
Even though the exclusion of the above variable increases validity of the model, it does not 
change the fact that they could potentially explain some of the results by being relevant in 
independent cases. A green minded institutional investor contemplating entering shipping 
would most likely review ESG scores and glance through the annual report to get a feel for 
“green focus” before investing. Some arbitrageurs will probably prefer high debt-to-equity 
ratios, as the potential rewards are higher if they time the shipping cycle correctly, while norm 
constrained investors have a different risk profile. Also, ownership concentration on firm 
performance in shipping companies are probably relevant in many cases, but because 
ownership concentration in the three equities is low, the results are inconclusive.  
In summary, only turnover stands out as being supported by theory and loads significantly in 
the same direction across the entire sample on equity risk. As expected, green bond issuance 
time trend dummy (GBI) is to various degrees positively correlated with the measures of 
institutional ownership for the three equities, these correlations are also significant. Total and 
idiosyncratic risk (SD and IR) are both significantly and negatively correlated with the GBI 
variable. These findings are in alignment with the theory and the results, suggesting that green 
bond issuance could help stabilize equity prices and, in some cases, increase institutional 
ownership, even though mediation effects are non-significant. Also as expected, Altera 
Infrastructure’s GBI variable shows no such effects. 
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6.2 Event window 
To better understand potential explanation of non-significant mediating effects, we first 
explore the time horizon of the study, before looking at the use of bond proceeds in detail. 
This study does not explore short-term effects, such as announcement effects, but the 
fundamental change in shipping companies’ ownership structure and risk profile after funding 
green projects by issuance of green bonds, in the longest period possible following issuance. 
Figure 6 shows the changes in institutional ownership for NYK and MOL combined decreases 
slightly after issuance before increasing again, while institutional ownership in the control 
groups decline steadily in the period following issuance.  
 
Figure 6 – Institutional ownership development Evergreen, NYK, MOL, 
ASIA, and EUROPE 
             Lines represent green bond issuance dates 
Figure 7 shows changes in institutional ownership for Altera Infrastructure compared to the 
fossil control group, where Altera Infrastructure institutional ownership of their preferred A 
shares remains flat after issuance, while the institutional ownership in the fossil control group 
continue to decline. From this we can infer that the results concerning institutional ownership 
is highly dependent on the event window studied. It is not possible to say with certainty that 
issuance of green bonds in shipping leads to an increase in institutional ownership, even 
though total institutional ownership between the three equities increased relative to the Asian 
control group, which is the most comparable control group in respect to geographical origin 
and market capitalization. 
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    Lines represent green bond issuance dates. Grey area excluded from calculations 
Considering that the literature on institutional ownership and firm performance is not 
consistent, it is not surprising that the results concerning institutional ownership is 
inconclusive.  
6.3 Bond specific reason for non-significant mediating effects 
Already touched upon in the data description, the use of proceeds primarily goes toward 
mandatory pollution prevention measures imposed by the international maritime organization 
(IMO). For instance, regulation concerning use of scrubbers, or use of low SOx fuels, went 
into force January 1, 2020. Also, BWMS have been mandatory for ocean going vessels for 
years prior to green bond issuance. For shipping, it is important to note that the criteria for 
being in alignment with the Paris Agreement in regard to carbon-intensity is higher than what 
IMOs goals for carbon reduction by 2050 are. This could be a contributing factor the general 
lack of more significant interest by institutional investors when shipping companies invest in 
green projects. The investment in green shipping projects might be seen by some as 
greenwashing because building a highly technical green (and expensive) dry bulk vessel might 
not make financial sense in the current regulatory environment, unless third parties are willing 
to bear the cost by increased freight rates. Bonds in alignment with the Paris Agreement can 
become certified by the climate bond initiative (CBI), which is a recognized non-profit London 
based organization. Criteria for the alignment in shipping was created in October 2020, as of 
May 2021 there are no green shipping bonds certified by CBI. 
Figure 7 – Institutional ownership development Altera 
Infrastructure and FOSSIL control group 
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6.4 Green economic trends in shipping 
Considering the recent world-wide multiple expansion of green companies, it is easy to draw 
a parallel to the dotcom mania at the start of the millennia. In a recent article by The Economist 
(2021), they address the question if we are in a green bubble, concluding that there will be 
winners and losers in the energy transition, and that it is important to note that two decades 
after the dotcom bust tech firms make up 38% of the S&P 500. When considering that 
investments in ESG related funds moved up from USD 38 billion in the first quarter of 2020, 
to USD 178 billion during the first quarter of 2021, there is definitely capital ready to be 
employed in shipping companies willing to take on green projects. A resent example of this 
(February 2021) is the acquisition of one of Norway leading transportation companies, 
Torghatten ASA, by the private equity firm EQT and the Norwegian government owned 
climate fund Nysnø, at a premium of 48% over 12-month volume weighted average price 
(EQT, 2020). Torghatten primarily operates ferries and have increased investment in 
electrifying its fleet in recent years.  
The current trend in 2021 also indicate that shipping companies are starting to take notice of 
potential benefits from implementing green projects. As of May 2021, four new shipping 
companies have issued bonds linked to sustainability targets. One of these sustainable linked 
bonds was issued in January 2021 by one of the world’s leading chemical tanker company, 
Odfjell SE. The bond, which primarily went to refinance old debt, was oversubscribed. Odfjell 
has set higher carbon intensity reduction targets than IMO and have started running several 
improvement and efficiency programs.  
Another green financing possibility are sustainable linked loans. The use of these types of 
financing have accelerated in the last year, eight shipping companies received loans related to 
sustainability in 2020, while four companies have received sustainable linked loans so far this 
year. It remains to be seen if investors reward Odfjell’s and these companies’ commitment to 
decarbonization and sustainability, but the sustainable bond and loan is definitely a step in the 
right direction. 
For Altera Infrastructure, causality inference is difficult to draw as we do not have the common 
equity to proxy for equity risk. However, as preferred shares in general are less risky than 
common equity, one would expect the preferred to be less volatile than the fossil control group. 
That is the case in the entire sample, but not the case after green bond issuance. From this we 
infer that equity investors in fossil related industries does not reap any direct benefits from 
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issuing green bonds. However, Brookfield Asset management, who already had a large equity 
stake in then Teekay Shuttle Tankers, acquired the remaining shares and merged them into 
their holding company only months after issuance. The initial offer of cash (or equity) 
consideration was equal to 33.6% premium on the offer date (Teekay, 2019). But the initial 
offer was made before the green bond announcement, so it is not possible to say this is 
attributed to the green bond. After the merger Brookfield changed the name to Altera 
Infrastructure, as they plan to focus on more environmental and sustainable projects in the 
future. This trend in rebranding, or greenwashing, of primarily fossil related companies have 
also increased in recent years, with Equinor being the largest example in Norway. Other 
companies, such as BW offshore, who owns and operates several FPSOs2, recently (May 
2021) developed a green bond framework where use of proceeds will go towards focus on 
renewable energy project. If these, and other fossil related rebranding’s bears any financial 
fruits could be an interesting topic for further research. In one case the results are in, Ørsted 
(formerly DONG Energy) as we write is the second most valuable company on the 
Copenhagen stock exchange, up approximately 400% since 2017.  
6.5 Further limitations – Evergreen, NYK, MOL 
Our original plan to estimate the change in cost of equity as a product of differences in equity 
risk resulting from the mediating, or indirect, effect of green bond issuance on equity risk 
through institutional ownership fell short, as lack of significance rendered further calculations 
worthless. Therefore, cost of equity calculations is based on relative changes in total risk which 
is endogenous on expected return. Further, relative reduction in cost of equity and increase in 
valuation could also, among other reasons, be a product of changes in cost of debt. However, 
we argue that this is not the case as debt-to-equity ratios trend in the opposite direction in both 
control groups, and cost of equity is reduced while valuation is increased when compared to 
both. Also, considering the five year sample period the explanatory power of the model could 
probably increase if checking for longer periods lagged periods than one month. Finally, 
problems concerning small sample size must be highlighted as our treatment group only 
consist of four green bond, four companies. Even though total equity risk is reduced, and the 
results are significant, this could simply be a coincident, which is why further research on 
 
2 Floating Production Storage and Offloading - vessel 
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green project financing in shipping over different periods should be performed when the 
sample size have grown. As mentioned above, sustainability linked bonds, green loans etc. 
can be included in such a study, as these instruments have increased rapidly in use since 
starting writing this thesis. Also, shipping firm’s reputation could be a potential latent variable 
used in further SEM structures concerning shipping and equity risk. 
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7. Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to increase knowledge about green project financing in shipping 
by investigating if companies are rewarded by increased institutional ownership and reduced 
equity risk following green bond issuance. For the fossil transportation company, Altera 
infrastructure, the results are inconclusive. But for the three other green bond issuing 
companies; Evergreen, NYK, and MOL (referred to as the three equities) the results show that 
in the years following green bond issuance, institutional ownership increased significantly 
relative to one of two control groups (Asian). The results also show that these institutional 
investors are not one homogenous group. The natural arbitrageurs are the largest institutional 
investors in shipping, while the norm-constrained institutions are the prominent responsible 
investors where the results are significant.  
Also, we find no stand-alone reduction in equity risk in the period following issuance for any 
of the three equities. However, total reduction in equity risk is highly significant for all three 
equities when compared to both control groups. These results hold when controlling for 
alternative measures of firm risk, various model specifications, and using lagged variables 
with bootstrapping techniques.  
Furthermore, as the three equities all have significant reductions in relative total risk, we 
explore if the difference in risk is associated with a reduction in cost of equity and increased 
relative valuation. The results show that relative cost of equity is reduced in two of three 
equities when compared to the first control group (Asian), and three of three when compared 
to the second (European). The results also show that when using multiple valuation techniques, 
all significant difference in valuation are expansions when compared to both control groups. 
From this we conclude that total equity risk is reduced, and valuation is increased in the period 
following green bond issuance for the three equities. 
This thesis contributes to the recent literature on green bonds by providing evidence of reduced 
equity risk and increased valuation in shipping companies in the period following green bond 
issuance. The implications of these findings are that equity owners in shipping companies 
could potentially benefit from implementation of green projects through issuance of financing 
instruments like green bonds.  
For the three equities: Even though the increase in institutional ownership is significant when 
compared to one of the two control groups, the results show no significant mediating effects 
of institutional ownership on equity risk. The reason being that the relative increase in 
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institutional ownership over the event windows is quite small, ranging from 1.9% to 3.0%. 
Also, in two of three equities institutional ownership first decline slightly after green bond 
issuance before increasing. Because of this, drawing causal inference of green bond issuance 
on increased institutional ownership is not possible as the level of institutional ownership is 
highly dependent on the event window studied.  
 
Other limitations, and suggestions for further research can be found in chapter 6.  
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Appendix 1 – Evergreen Marine Corp. correlation matrix 
  IO NORM ARB SD IR GBI TURN CON ESG GF DE AGE MCAP 
IO 1.0000 
            
NORM 0.7135* 1.0000 
           
ARB 0.8612* 0.2583* 1.0000 
          
SD 0.4018* 0.2473 0.3746* 1.0000 
         
IR 0.4109* 0.2753* 0.3668* 0.9861* 1.0000 
        
GBI 0.3203* 0.1505 0.3324* -0.0013 -0.0393 1.0000 
       
TURN 0.6506* 0.5518* 0.4968* 0.6225* 0.6040* 0.1912 1.0000 
      
CON -0.4277* -0.1114 -0.5089* -0.1016 -0.0627 -0.8900* -0.2994* 1.0000 
     
ESG 0.5783* 0.2077 0.6467* 0.0799 0.0574 0.8402* 0.2467 -0.8614* 1.0000 
    
GF 0.4609* 0.1710 0.5114* 0.0471 0.0137 0.8684* 0.2816* -0.9149* 0.7972* 1.0000 
   
DE 0.2513 0.0945 0.2779* 0.0560 0.0336 0.5562* 0.1418 -0.5059* 0.3343* 0.6995* 1.0000 
  
AGE 0.5862* 0.2161 0.6515* 0.1701 0.1412 0.8558* 0.3596* -0.9546* 0.8622* 0.9400* 0.5610* 1.0000 
 
MCAP 0.7766* 0.5296* 0.6865* 0.4865* 0.4811* 0.3130* 0.9197* -0.4533* 0.4806* 0.4240* 0.1312 0.5303* 1.0000 
SD - Standard deviation, IR - Idiosyncratic risk, GBI - Green bond issuance period Evergreen, TURN - Turnover, CON - Ownership concentration,  
GF - Green focus, DE - debt-to-equity ratio. AGE - Age of firm, MCAP - Market capitalization, * p<0.05  
 
 
Appendix 2 – Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK) correlation matrix 
  IO NORM ARB SD IR GBI TURN CON ESG GF DE AGE MCAP 
IO 1.0000 
            
NORM 0.5129* 1.0000 
           
ARB 0.8982* 0.0834 1.0000 
          
SD -0.3200* -0.3412* -0.1968 1.0000 
         
IR -0.0552 0.0284 -0.0787 0.0683 1.0000 
        
GBI 0.2353 0.8268* -0.1502 -0.1345 -0.1735 1.0000 
       
TURN -0.0477 -0.3355* 0.1164 0.5336* 0.5551* -0.2834* 1.0000 
      
CON 0.7127* 0.5595* 0.5409* -0.4670* -0.4444* 0.3650* 0.0549 1.0000 
     
ESG 0.3694* 0.5169* 0.1642 0.1172 0.1179 0.6183* -0.0242 0.2060 1.0000 
    
GF 0.4099* 0.6930* 0.1210 -0.4609* -0.4571* 0.7208* -0.2939* 0.5958* 0.4925* 1.0000 
   
DE 0.5510* 0.8181* 0.2208 -0.3413* -0.3551* 0.7682* -0.0701 0.7387* 0.6487* 0.7980* 1.0000 
  
AGE 0.5724* 0.8724* 0.2178 -0.1877 -0.2117 0.8587* -0.2697* 0.5901* 0.6846* 0.7677* 0.8465* 1.0000 
 
MCAP 0.1536 -0.5563* 0.4632* -0.0038 0.0291 -0.7013* 0.1953 -0.0804 -0.4274* -0.4156* -0.4758* -0.5365* 1.0000 
SD - Standard deviation, IR - Idiosyncratic risk, GBI - Green bond issuance period NYK, TURN - Turnover, CON - Ownership concentration, GF - 
Green focus, DE -  debt-to-equity ratio. AGE - Age of firm, MCAP - Market capitalization, * p<0.05  
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Appendix 3 – Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (MOL) correlation matrix 
  IO NORM ARB SD IR GBI TURN CON ESG GF DE AGE MCAP 
IO 1.0000 
            
NORM 0.7151* 1.0000 
           
ARB 0.9155* 0.3734* 1.0000 
          
SD 0.3272* 0.4346* 0.1841 1.0000 
         
IR 0.1138 0.0201 0.1394 -0.0644 1.0000 
        
GBI 0.2279 -0.2892* 0.4689* 0.0747 0.0399 1.0000 
       
TURN 0.2560* 0.4189* 0.0986 0.7179* 0.7188* -0.0931 1.0000 
      
CON 0.2646* 0.3281* 0.1623 -0.2197 -0.2229 -0.4653* -0.3038* 1.0000 
     
ESG 0.3177* 0.1390 0.3417* -0.1965 -0.1769 0.3539* -0.1319 0.0648 1.0000 
    
GF 0.4854* 0.0862 0.5945* 0.0927 0.0569 0.8366* 0.0237 -0.3317* 0.5584* 1.0000 
   
DE 0.0260 -0.2357 0.1702 -0.1481 -0.1383 0.4269* -0.2720* -0.0661 0.4754* 0.3123* 1.0000 
  
AGE 0.3826* -0.0945 0.5621* -0.0597 -0.0972 0.8587* -0.1692 -0.2459 0.5269* 0.9431* 0.4311* 1.0000 
 
MCAP -0.2486 -0.1661 -0.2343 -0.6594* -0.6483* -0.4853* -0.4524* 0.5416* 0.1282 -0.4152* -0.1193 -0.3110* 1.0000 
SD - Standard deviation, IR - Idiosyncratic risk, GBI - Green bond issuance period MOL, TURN - Turnover, CON - Ownership concentration, GF - 
Green focus, DE - debt-to-equity ratio. AGE - Age of firm, MCAP - Market capitalization, * p<0.05  
 
Appendix 4 – Altera Infrastructure correlation matrix 
  IO ARB SD IR TURN GBI CON AGE MCAP 
   
IO 1.0000 
           
ARB 1.0000* 1.0000 
          
SD 0.0206 0.0206 1.0000 
         
IR -0.0130 -0.0130 0.6179* 1.0000  
        
GBI -0.3786* -0.3786* 0.1546 0.1335 1.0000 
       
TURN -0.0335 -0.0335 0.5650* 0.5818* -0.1051 1.0000 
      
CON -0.5900* -0.5900* 0.0846 0.1153 0.8208* -0.1706 1.0000 
     
AGE -0.6616* -0.6616* 0.0936 0.1394 0.7348* -0.1018 0.9578* 1.0000 
    
MCAP 0.0542 0.0542 -0.7348* -0.7299* -0.4136* -0.2338 -0.3485* -0.3386* 1.0000 
   
SD - Standard deviation, IDI. RISK - Idiosyncratic risk, GBI - Green bond issuance period Altera Infrastructure, TURN - Turnover, 




Appendix 5 – Asian control group correlation matrix 
  IO NORM ARB SD IR GBI TURN CON ESG GF DE AGE MCAP 
IO 1.0000 
            
NORM 0.7390* 1.0000 
           
ARB 0.9237* 0.4246* 1.0000 
          
SD -0.0476 -0.2211 0.0618 1.0000 
         
IR -0.0532 -0.2865* 0.0915 0.5664* 1.0000 
        
GBI -0.3028* -0.7091* -0.0038 0.3122* 0.2988* 1.0000 
       
TURN -0.1166 -0.0355 -0.1365 0.6454* 0.6510* -0.1871 1.0000 
      
CON -0.1387 -0.0545 -0.1554 -0.6054* -0.6216* 0.1075 -0.6652* 1.0000 
     
ESG 0.2553* -0.0433 0.3678* 0.1221 0.1494 0.3338* -0.0074 -0.0507 1.0000 
    
GF -0.3150* -0.6139* -0.0743 0.1976 0.1912 0.8102* -0.1983 0.0599 0.3996* 1.0000 
   
DE -0.1889 -0.5116* 0.0370 0.3553* 0.3631* 0.7478* -0.0612 -0.2448 0.4109* 0.8479* 1.0000 
  
AGE -0.4804* -0.7539* -0.2169 0.2683* 0.2494 0.8669* -0.1228 0.0856 0.4224* 0.9221* 0.7973* 1.0000 
 
MCAP -0.1770 0.0109 -0.2441 -0.2346 -0.2363 -0.2717* 0.2581* 0.2342 0.2719* -0.0646 -0.2679* -0.0139 1.0000 
SD - Standard deviation, IR - Idiosyncratic risk, GBI - Green bond issuance period (average three equities), TURN - Turnover, CON - Ownership 
concentration, GF - Green focus, DE - debt-to-equity ratio. AGE - Age of firm, MCAP - Market capitalization, * p<0.05  
 
Appendix 6 – European control group correlation matrix 
  IO NORM ARB SD IR GBI TURN CON ESG GF DE AGE MCAP 
IO 1.0000 
            
NORM 0.6675* 1.0000 
           
ARB 0.8276* 0.1344 1.0000 
          
SD 0.0917 0.2648* -0.0775 1.0000 
         
IR 0.2039 0.1794 0.1362 0.5350* 1.0000 
        
GBI 0.7452* 0.5437* 0.5818* 0.3537* 0.3648* 1.0000 
       
TURN -0.4185* -0.1823 -0.4195* 0.4540* 0.3560* -0.3227* 1.0000 
      
CON -0.4845* -0.3942* -0.3476* 0.0294 0.0131 -0.2397 0.1694 1.0000 
     
ESG 0.4910* 0.0270 0.6330* -0.1180 -0.0026 0.5377* -0.3919* -0.0103 1.0000 
    
GF 0.6324* 0.4774* 0.4816* 0.3512* 0.3983* 0.9027* -0.2113 -0.2592* 0.5599* 1.0000 
   
DE 0.3597* 0.2494 0.2907* 0.2763* 0.3798* 0.6352* -0.1416 -0.3683* 0.5631* 0.7623* 1.0000 
  
AGE 0.6085* 0.4161* 0.4961* 0.3300* 0.3833* 0.8669* -0.2224 -0.2666* 0.6038* 0.9839* 0.8010* 1.0000 
 
MCAP -0.0810 -0.1111 -0.0240 -0.1924 -0.0605 -0.0378 -0.1701 -0.0522 0.2753* 0.1429 0.3857* 0.2608* 1.0000 
SD - Standard deviation, IR - Idiosyncratic risk, GBI - Green bond issuance period (average three equities), TURN - Turnover, CON - Ownership 
concentration, GF - Green focus, DE – debt-to-equity ratio. AGE - Age of firm, MCAP - Market capitalization, * p<0.05  
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Appendix 7 – Fossil control group correlation matrix 
  IO NORM ARB SD IR GBI TURN CON AGE MCAP 
  
IO 1.0000 
           
NORM 0.4438* 1.0000 
          
ARB 0.9990* 0.4041* 1.0000 
         
SD 0.3367* 0.5978* 0.3144* 1.0000 
        
IR 0.3474* 0.5131* 0.3296* 0.5555* 1.0000 
       
GBI -0.4429* 0.3453* -0.4689* 0.3851* 0.4252* 1.0000 
      
TURN 0.0327 0.5746* 0.0053 0.8406* 0.8328* 0.6112* 1.0000 
     
CON -0.3761* -0.4997* -0.3594* -0.2557* -0.2184 0.2232 -0.1864 1.0000 
    
AGE -0.7792* -0.0339 -0.7937* 0.0231 0.0141 0.7348* 0.3097* 0.2084 1.0000 
   
MCAP -0.1004 -0.1758 -0.0938 -0.5325* -0.5144* -0.3131* -0.3756* -0.1733 -0.2546* 1.0000 
  
SD - Standard deviation, IR - Idiosyncratic risk, GBI - Green bond issuance period Altera Infrastructure, TURN - Turnover,  








Appendix 8 – ASIA, EUROPE, FOSSIL Control groups   
  ASIA EUROPE FOSSIL 
 IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB 
IO, NORM, ARB (Dep. Var)         
GBI -0.0084** -0.0084*** -0.0001 0.0246*** 0.0102*** 0.0145*** -0.0854*** 0.0032*** -0.0885*** 
 (-2.46) (-7.79) (-0.03) (8.66) (5.02) (5.54) (-3.83) (2.85) (-4.11)    
Constant 0.2321*** 0.0455*** 0.1866*** 0.1928*** 0.0318*** 0.1610*** 0.4806*** 0.0596*** 0.4211*** 
 (97.48) (61.09) (100.36) (97.63) (22.56) (88.97) (43.09) (106.62) (39.11)    
Std. Dev (Dep. Var)         
IO 0.0764** 0.2402** 0.0863** -0.0480 0.0642 -0.1005* 0.0285*** 0.3094** 0.0295*** 
 (2.41) (2.33) (2.12) (-1.00) (1.00) (-1.96) (4.61) (2.16) (4.64)    
GBI 0.0056*** 0.0069*** 0.0049*** 0.0072*** 0.0055*** 0.0074*** 0.0006 -0.0034** 0.0007    
 (6.20) (5.61) (5.73) (4.76) (4.39) (6.05) (0.40) (-2.51) (0.49)    
Turnover 1.1435*** 1.1590*** 1.1258*** 12.1136*** 12.7028*** 11.5132*** 1.3752*** 1.4764*** 1.3816*** 
 (9.60) (9.58) (9.43) (5.99) (6.54) (5.79) (10.09) (9.32) (10.21)    
Constant -0.0106 -0.0039 -0.0089 0.0095 -0.0025 0.0172* -0.0029 -0.0081 -0.0017    
 (-1.41) (-0.80) (-1.15) (0.93) (-0.76) (1.84) (-1.03) (-0.98) (-0.66)    
Indirect effect -0.0006* -0.0020** -0.0000 -0.0012 0.0007 -0.0015* -0.0024*** 0.0010* -0.0026*** 
Total effect 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0060*** 0.0061*** 0.0054*** -0.0018 -0.0024* -0.0019 
R2 IO, NORM, ARB 0.0917 0.5028 0.0000 0.5554 0.2956 0.3385 0.1961 0.1192 0.2199 
R2 SD 0.6627 0.6660 0.6499 0.4777 0.4943 0.4852 0.7653 0.7226 0.7670 
R2 total 0.6915 0.8327 0.6404 0.7578 0.6160 0.6583 0.8095 0.7318 0.8169 
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
ASIA - Asian control group, EUROPE – European control group, FOSSIL - Fossil fuel control group 
GBI - Green Bond Issuance (ASIA, EUROPE), average for Evergreen NYK, and MOL (not the same numbers used in calculations). TURN - Average daily turnover of 
outstanding shares 
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Appendix 9 – Green bond companies results lagged 
 Evergreen NYK MOL AI 
 IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB IO 
lag. Institutional investor (Dep. Var)                        
lag.GBI 0.0097** 0.0023 0.0074** 0.0197 0.0333*** -0.0136 0.0193 -0.0102** 0.0296*** -0.0546*** 
 (2.32) (1.04) (2.49) (1.63) (11.53) (-1.31) (1.63) (-2.09) (4.28) (-5.41)    
Constant 0.1254*** 0.0594*** 0.0660*** 0.3345*** 0.0838*** 0.2508*** 0.4548*** 0.1273*** 0.3275*** 0.2682*** 
 (41.23) (50.84) (28.54) (36.21) (30.03) (34.16) (160.98) (117.34) (143.87) (26.77)    
Equity price volatility (Dep. Var)         
lag.Institutional investor 0.0398 -0.0346 0.0764 -0.0273** -0.1617*** -0.0221 0.0242* 0.0836** 0.0213 0.0260    
 (0.83) (-0.34) (1.11) (-2.06) (-3.12) (-1.42) (1.96) (2.00) (1.17) (1.16)    
lag.GBI -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0020* -0.0008 0.0038* -0.0017 0.0006 0.0018 0.0004 0.0057*   
 (-1.42) (-1.33) (-1.78) (-0.62) (1.85) (-1.22) (0.47) (1.38) (0.31) (1.86)    
lag.TURN 0.2016* 0.2542*** 0.2008** 0.2042 0.0541 0.2189 0.9610*** 0.8647*** 1.0167*** 1.3494**  
 (1.73) (2.65) (2.22) (0.64) (0.17) (0.69) (5.87) (4.38) (5.92) (2.48)    
Constant 0.0087 0.0155*** 0.0086** 0.0220*** 0.0282*** 0.0182*** -0.0047 -0.0033 -0.0012 0.0030    
 (1.53) (2.63) (1.99) (3.74) (4.36) (3.52) (-0.81) (-0.69) (-0.19) (0.48)    
Indirect effect 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0054*** 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0009 0.0006 -0.0014 
Total effect -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0014 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0042 
R2 Institutional investor 0.0930 0.0192 0.1014 0.0467  0.6818 0.0289 0.0540 0.0804 0.2219 0.1394 
R2 Equity price volatility 0.2051 0.2735 0.2185 0.1007 0.1709 0.0722 0.3451 0.3368 0.3514 0.1755 
R2 total 0.2721 0.2844 0.2832 0.0705 0.6987 0.0795 0.3601 0.3553 0.4887 0.2849 
Observations 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 27 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Evergreen - Evergreen Marine Corp., NYK - Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, MOL - Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, AI - Altera infrastructure   





Appendix 10 – Difference in difference three equities vs ASIA control group lagged 
  Evergreen vs ASIA NYK vs ASIA MOL vs ASIA 
 IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB 
lag. Institutional investor (Dep. Var)        
lag.GBI 0.0196*** 0.0106*** 0.0090* 0.0288** 0.0413*** -0.0125 0.0284** -0.0022 0.0306*** 
 (3.13) (4.15) (1.84) (2.10) (12.11) (-1.14) (2.35) (-0.41) (3.28) 
Constant -0.1081*** 0.0137*** -0.1218*** 0.1020*** 0.0387*** 0.0633*** 0.2223*** 0.0823*** 0.1400*** 
 (-22.40) (10.35) (-28.76) (9.80) (11.71) (7.32) (43.10) (54.31) (31.29) 
Equity price volatility (Dep. Var)        
lag.Institutional investor 0.0929** 0.0076 0.1221*** -0.0071 -0.0478 -0.0052 0.0097 0.0335 0.0089 
 (2.29) (0.08) (2.97) (-0.61) (-1.04) (-0.36) (0.71) (1.05) (0.43) 
lag.GBI -0.0051*** -0.0041** -0.0046*** -0.0044*** -0.0027 -0.0047*** -0.0030** -0.0026** -0.0030** 
 (-3.21) (-2.43) (-3.10) (-3.72) (-1.21) (-4.23) (-2.45) (-2.00) (-2.33) 
lag.TURN 0.0086 0.1555 0.0477 0.2300 0.2126 0.2375 0.4175* 0.3968* 0.4144* 
 (0.05) (0.78) (0.32) (1.34) (1.37) (1.44) (1.88) (1.96) (1.81) 
Constant 0.0108** 0.0009 0.0157*** 0.0009 0.0021 0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0005 
 (2.27) (0.47) (2.90) (0.59) (1.01) (0.29) (-0.38) (-0.65) (-0.14) 
Indirect effect 0.0018** 0.0001 0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0020 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0003 
Total effect -0.0033** -0.0040** -0.0035** -0.0046*** -0.0047*** -0.0046*** -0.0027** -0.0027** -0.0027** 
R2 Institutional investor 0.1549 0.2379 0.0599 0.0738 0.7030 0.0199 0.0857 0.0036 0.1852 
R2 Equity price volatility 0.2392 0.1393 0.2565 0.2654 0.2722 0.2640 0.1832 0.1808 0.1771 
R2 total 0.3175 0.3322 0.2229 0.2918 0.7239 0.2783 0.2530 0.1684 0.3277 
Observations 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Evergreen - Evergreen Marine Corp., NYK - Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, MOL - Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, ASIA - Asian control group 
GBI - Green Bond Issuance, TURN - Average daily turnover of outstanding shares 
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Appendix 11 – Difference in difference three equities vs EUROPE control group lagged 
  Evergreen vs EUROPE NYK vs EUROPE MOL vs EUROPE 
 IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB IO NORM ARB 
lag. Institutional investor (Dep. Var)        
lag.GBI -0.0150*** -0.0084*** -0.0066 -0.0012 0.0244*** -0.0256** -0.0016 -0.0192*** 0.0176* 
 (-3.16) (-2.81) (-1.48) (-0.10) (8.56) (-2.27) (-0.11) (-3.62) (1.79) 
Constant -0.0672*** 0.0282*** -0.0953*** 0.1390*** 0.0512*** 0.0878*** 0.2593*** 0.0947*** 0.1645*** 
 (-24.65) (14.93) (-34.23) (16.55) (19.50) (13.29) (67.65) (46.67) (48.78) 
Equity price volatility (Dep. Var)        
lag.Institutional investor 0.0003 -0.0399 0.0215 -0.0099 -0.0868 -0.0040 0.0064 0.0124 0.0086 
 (0.01) (-0.52) (0.43) (-0.81) (-1.52) (-0.28) (0.56) (0.37) (0.53) 
lag.GBI -0.0059*** -0.0063*** -0.0057*** -0.0046*** -0.0025 -0.0047*** -0.0029** -0.0026* -0.0030** 
 (-2.99) (-3.36) (-3.55) (-3.76) (-1.42) (-2.96) (-2.33) (-1.86) (-2.19) 
lag.TURN 0.2818 0.3020** 0.2673* 0.5602* 0.5529* 0.5501 0.3431* 0.3408 0.3558 
 (1.55) (2.01) (1.81) (1.66) (1.69) (1.63) (1.79) (1.33) (1.63) 
Constant -0.0018 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0053 -0.0021 -0.0062 -0.0044 -0.0039 -0.0043 
 (-0.44) (-0.34) (0.04) (-1.23) (-0.47) (-1.50) (-1.34) (-1.20) (-1.31) 
Indirect effect -0.0000 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0021 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0002 
Total effect -0.0059*** -0.0060*** -0.0059*** -0.0046*** -0.0046*** -0.0046*** -0.0029** -0.0029** -0.0029** 
R2 Institutional investor 0.1314 0.1144 0.0410 0.0002 0.4909 0.0906 -0.0029 0.2114 0.0658 
R2 Equity price volatility 0.3262 0.3497 0.3155 0.3173 0.3505 0.3096 0.1386 0.1366 0.1415 
R2 total 0.4043 0.4223 0.3329 0.3133 0.5626 0.3628 0.1353 0.2976 0.1976 
Observations 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Evergreen - Evergreen Marine Corp., NYK - Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, MOL - Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, EUROPE – European control group 





Appendix 12 – Difference in difference Altera infrastructure vs FOSSIL control group lagged 
  AI 
 IO ARB 
lag. Institutional investor (Dep. 
Var)   
lag.GBI 0.0264** 0.0299**  
 (2.01) (2.45)    
Constant -0.2081*** -0.1488*** 
 (-27.97) (-20.62)    
Equity price volatility (Dep. Var)   
lag.Institutional investor 0.0031 0.0013    
 (0.21) (0.52)    
lag.GBI 0.0013 0.6290    
 (0.43) (1.46)    
lag.TURN 0.6286 0.0042    
 (1.46) (0.26)    
Constant -0.0009 -0.0009    
 (-0.28) (-0.35)    
Indirect effect 0.0001 0.0001 
Total effect 0.0014 0.0014 
R2 Institutional investor 0.0558 0.0751 
R2 Equity price volatility 0.1345 0.1349 
R2 total 0.1824 0.1995 
Observations 27 27 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
AI - Altera infrastructure, GBI - Green Bond Issuance, TURN - Average daily turnover of outstanding shares 
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Appendix 13 – Descriptive table of dropped variables 
   
  Variable Obs Mean Median Min Max 
DE 
     
 
Evergreen 60 2.141 2.072 1.56 2.795  
NYK 60 1.928 1.935 1.218 2.402  
MOL 60 2.052 2.108 1.544 2.295  
ASIA 60 1.785 1.559 1.182 2.805 
  EUROPE 60 0.6099 0.6264 0.3928 0.8418 
AGE 
     
 
Evergreen 60 50 50 48 52  
NYK 60 133 133 131 135  
MOL 60 134 134 132 136  
Altera inf. 28 12 12 10 14  
ASIA 60 62.2 62.2 60.2 64.2  
EUROPE 60 69 69 67 71 
  FOSSIL 28 49 49 47 51 
Market Cap 
     
 
Evergreen 60 1871 1782 1222 5145  
NYK 60 3139 3169 2123 4459  
MOL 60 3055 2996 1990 4358  
Altera inf. 28 110.5 113.4 68.91 139.9  
ASIA 60 8770 8135 5809 15967  
EUROPE 60 36859 35895 28035 58788 
  FOSSIL 28 2164 2160 1729 2725 
  Variable Obs Mean Median Min Max 
CON 
     
 
Evergreen 60 0.0946 0.0930 0.0814 0.1062  
NYK 60 0.0461 0.0472 0.0337 0.0526  
MOL 60 0.0632 0.0665 0.0383 0.0747  
Altera Inf. 28 0.6195 0.5950 0.2750 0.9870  
ASIA 60 0.4398 0.4393 0.3522 0.6003  
EUROPE 60 0.3169 0.3066 0.2951 0.3734 
  FOSSIL 28 0.2857 0.2836 0.2064 0.3288 
ESG 
     
 
Evergreen 60 56.11 63.52 28.71 71.15  
NYK 60 55.62 48.17 38.13 81.5  
MOL 60 41.87 46.03 0 59.25  
ASIA 60 49.88 50.2 40.16 56.42 
  EUROPE 60 47.62 53.66 0 63.73 
GF 
     
 
Evergreen 60 157.6 125 80 245  
NYK 60 391.6 400 308 467  
MOL 60 256.8 200 142 432  
ASIA 60 166.9 162.3 139.4 190.4 
  EUROPE 60 53.96 54.48 27.98 81.59 
CON: Ownership Concentration, ESG: ESG-Score, GF: Green focus textual analysis, DE: Debt-to-equity, AGE: Age of company, Market Cap: average market capitalization 
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